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ABSTRACT
On any given day, we make tons of decisions. These can be as simple as deciding 
how to dress or what to eat, or more complex, such as whether to spend or invest 
money. Good decision-making involves being able to select the best alternative 
from a range of options, and adjust one’s preferences based on what is happening 
in the environment. As humans get older, their ability to do this changes. Age-
related changes in decision-making ability result from changes in brain structure 
and function, such as the deterioration of the brain’s dopaminergic system in 
old age. In this thesis, we used a sample of 30 older and 30 younger participants 
to investigate age-related differences in neural and behavioural correlates of 
value-based decision-making, which involves making decisions that can result 
in rewards and punishments. Such decisions are known to rely on dopaminergic 
functioning. In the brain, we have looked at neural activity reflecting value and 
reward prediction errors (RPEs), the availability of dopamine D1 receptors, and 
integrity of white matter microstructure. For the behavioural data, we have used 
computational modelling to disentangle motivational biases and other parameters 
reflecting parts of the learning process that underlies successful decision-making. 
In study 1, we investigated whether performance on a value-based decision-
making task differed between the two age groups. We also looked at whether 
performance differences could be explained by differential neural processing of 
RPEs and expected value in the striatum and prefrontal cortex (PFC). We used 
a novel computational model to estimate expected value, decision uncertainty 
and confidence. We found that older adults earned fewer rewards on the task. 
The number of rewards earned could be predicted by the strength of the neural 
signal reflecting expected value in the ventromedial PFC (vmPFC), which was 
attenuated in older adults. Beyond age, the strength of this neural signal could be 
predicted by dopamine D1 receptor (D1-R) availability in the nucleus accumbens 
(NAcc). In study 2, we showed that integrity of white matter microstructure in 
the pathway between the NAcc and vmPFC also predicted the neural value signal 
in the vmPFC, independently of age and D1-R availability in the NAcc.
In study 3 and 4, we focused on dissociating the effects of action and valence on 
neural and behavioural correlates of decision-making. In study 3, we used com-
putational modelling to characterize faster learning to act in response to rewards, 
and abstaining from acting in response to punishments, as being the result of 
biased instrumental learning. Study 3 also showed that variability in dopamine 
D1-R availability could be divided into cortical, dorsal striatal and ventral striatal 
components. Regardless of age, dopamine D1-R availability in the dorsal striatal 
component was related to biased learning from rewarded actions. In study 4 we 
investigated anticipatory value signals after learning had reached an asymptote. 
We observed no differences between age groups in anticipatory neural responses 
to action and valence, and no relationship between anticipatory neural signals 
and dopamine D1-R availability. Older adults did show an attenuated punishment 
prediction error signal in the insula, compared with younger adults. The strength 
of differentiation between reward- and punishment prediction error signals in 
the insula was related to dopamine D1-R availability in the cortex. 
These studies have demonstrated that the existing theoretical framework sur-
rounding the role of dopamine system in decision-making and aging fits with 
dopamine D1-R availability data and behavioural data in older and younger adults, 
and partly explain why older adults show behavioural differences in value-based 
decision-making tasks. Collectively, the studies in this thesis provide important 
multimodal evidence that increases our understanding of the neural correlates that 
underlie value-based decision-making and how they are affected in healthy aging.
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1INTRODUCTION
As humans age, many changes occur in the brain. Among these are changes in 
neurochemical integrity. For example, the number of cells producing and recep-
tors responding to the neurotransmitter dopamine, decrease at a rate of between 
5-10% per decade from the age of 30 (Kaasinen et al., 2000; Suhara et al., 1991; 
Volkow et al., 1994, 1998). Aging also affects the brain’s structural integrity. Both 
longitudinal and cross-sectional studies have demonstrated that the total grey 
matter, which contains the cell bodies of neurons, decreases across the lifespan. 
Similarly, both the microstructural integrity (Moscufo et al., 2018) and the total 
amount of white matter, containing myelinated axons that connect neurons, 
decreases across the lifespan (Grady, 2012).
Because the brain is important for cognition, it is not surprising that these large 
changes in brain structure are paralleled by a decrease in a number of cognitive 
abilities. For example, older people have lower processing speed (Salthouse, 1992), 
consistently perform worse on tasks that measure working memory (Gazzaley 
et al., 2005; Salthouse, 1992; West, 1999), episodic memory (Old and Naveh-
Benjamin, 2008; Rönnlund et al., 2005), cognitive flexibility (Chao and Knight, 
1997; Lindenberger and Baltes, 1997) and decision-making (Eppinger et al., 
2011; Mell et al., 2005). The simultaneous decline in structural brain integrity 
and cognitive performance means that aging provides a natural experimental 
setting to investigate how the brain works, allowing for the investigation of cor-
relations between cognition, age, and brain structure and function, including 
dopaminergic integrity (Bäckman et al., 2006). 
In this thesis, I will focus on dopamine and decision-making. Decision-making is 
a broad term, within psychology defined as “the cognitive process resulting in the 
selection of a belief or a course of action among several alternative possibilities” (Wang 
and Ruhe, 2007). Decision-makers have to weight evidence reflecting benefits 
associated with several options, and select one of the options in light of that evi-
dence (Montague et al., 2012). Specifically, we use value-based decision-making 
tasks. These are experimental situations where decisions are made based on the 
learnt expected values of a set of choices that lead to rewards or punishments 
(Daw and Doya, 2006). Older adults show suboptimal performance on value-based 
decision-making tasks in experimental settings compared with younger adults, 
especially when they have to adapt their behaviour to changing environments 
(Mell et al., 2005). 
In the remainder of this introduction, I will discuss these interrelated topics. First, 
I will discuss how value-based decision-making can be studied with computational 
models. Second, I will give a brief overview of the neuroanatomy and the role of 
the dopaminergic system in the human brain, and its role in value-based decision-
2making. Third, I will review evidence on how aging interacts with the dopaminergic 
system and how effects of aging modulate decision-making performance. Fourth, I 
will discuss the ways in which we can study the dopaminergic system in humans, 
and why we used positron emission tomography (PET) in the studies in this thesis.
Computational models of decision-making
Decision-making in the natural environment is hugely complex, and may at first 
seem difficult to formally investigate. However, the development of computa-
tional modelling techniques has made it possible for researchers to study intricate 
decision-making processes. These models can be set up in many different ways, 
but will always include a number of parameters that determine how individuals 
learn about which choices are good, and which choices are bad. These parameters 
take on different values for each individual, which results in different predicted 
preferences for each person. The purpose of these individualised models is for them 
to closely mimic each individual’s behaviour. Once these parameter values have 
been determined, they can be correlated with features of that individual’s neural 
integrity, such as markers of the dopaminergic system, brain structure or brain 
activity in task-relevant brain areas, with the goal of increasing our understand-
ing of how patterns of brain activation, as well as indicators of neurotransmitter 
functioning, are involved in behaviour. I will outline a few different approaches 
to computational modelling below. 
Reinforcement learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a term from the field of computer science, and 
refers to how learners incorporate reward-related information about the environ-
ment into their behaviour in order to maximize future rewards. RL algorithms 
formally describe this learning process (Sutton and Barto, 1998). In this thesis, 
we use RL algorithms to create agents who imitate a human performing a value-
based decision-making task. The modelled RL agent iteratively estimates values 
for each available choice at each task trial, and makes decisions based on those 
values. The values are estimated and updated when the agent receives rewards 
(and punishments) as a consequence of their choices. The agent will then adapt 
their behaviour, usually adhering to the policy of maximising the number (or mag-
nitude) of positive reinforcements and minimising the number (or magnitude) of 
negative reinforcements. 
A more detailed RL description of a value-based decision-making task goes 
something like this: At each time step, agents who are in a certain state select 
an action from a set of possible actions. This action leads to a reward, which can 
be positive (reward) or negative (punishment). The type and magnitude of the 
reward as a consequence of the selected action is determined by the environment. 
3In the studies presented in this thesis, the environment is determined by the task 
contingencies that map choices to outcomes. When the reward is experienced, 
the state of the agent is updated and the cycle is repeated. Agents in RL problems 
learn which states are most rewarding, and how good it is to perform a given 
action, given a certain state. The agent then builds up a set of learnt expected 
values about different alternatives in the environment. The rules by which this 
occurs are described by a value function (Sutton and Barto, 1998). 
Rescorla-Wagner
A simple value function often used in computational models of decision-making 
is the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule. This rule is strictly speaking not taken from 
RL in the computer science context, but was instead developed as a result of clas-
sical conditioning experiments, where animals associatively learned about stimuli 
from positive and negative reinforcements (Daw and Tobler, 2013; Rescorla and 
Wagner, 1972). The Rescorla-Wagner rule is derived from the idea that the dis-
crepancy between a received and expected reward as the result of a conditioned 
stimulus informs future expectations about that stimulus. The difference between 
the received and expected reward is called prediction error, and the learning rule 
updates the value of the conditioned stimulus based on that prediction error. 
Formally, the Rescorla-Wagner rule approximates the value (V) of a stimulus s 
on trial t+1 as follows:
 (1)
In English, this formula states that the value V of a stimulus s on trial t+1 is equal 
to the value of that stimulus on trial t, with the addition of the prediction error 
δ. The prediction error is multiplied by a learning rate α (with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1), that 
determines to what extent the future value estimate is affected by the prediction 
error. As stated above, the prediction error is defined as the difference between 
expected and obtained value on a given choice:
 (2)
In stable environments, the value estimate for choice a converges on the mean 
probability of reward for that stimulus, because a stable environment leads to 
predictable reward rates, reducing δ. In such a stable environment, the learning 
rate indicates how fast the value converges onto this mean value. The learning 
rate may be slow in such situations, because occasional unexpected rewards should 
not affect expected values in these environments too much. In more unstable 
environments, reward feedback will be more variable, and prediction errors will 
be greater. Learning should also be faster, as changes in reward feedback may 
reflect actual changes in the environment. Therefore, α may change with increased 
uncertainty about the environment (Behrens et al., 2007; Dayan et al., 2000).
4The Rescorla-Wagner learning rule could be conceived of as a simple value function 
in RL: an organism updates the value of a stimulus (or action, or state) based on the 
difference between expectations and reality. Because of the way dopamine neurons 
respond to rewarding and non-rewarding outcomes, Rescorla-Wagner models are 
often used when studying the dopaminergic system (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; 
Chowdhury et al., 2013a; Daw, 2011; Daw et al., 2006; Guitart-Masip et al., 2011, 
2014a; Hamid et al., 2016; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Swart et al., 2017). 
The Rescorla-Wagner learning rule cannot fully account for the temporal dynamics 
of dopaminergic firing in the midbrain (Schultz et al., 1997). Other more elabo-
rate algorithms from the field of RL have been useful in capturing some crucial 
aspects of neural and behavioural aspects of decision-making. First, whereas the 
Rescorla-Wagner rule is “trial-based” (Schultz et al., 1997), other RL algorithms 
distinguish between states, actions and outcomes, which means that stimulus 
onset at the beginning of a trial can carry value. Second, the Rescorla-Wagner 
rule does not take into account the goal of the decision-maker (Daw and Tobler, 
2013). This is not surprising, given that it was developed as a rule to describe 
classical conditioning. However, decision-makers have the long-term goal of 
maximising rewards. This is another problem that can be solved by other RL 
algorithms. Here, I will specifically discuss Q-learning, a form of temporal dif-
ference (TD) learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998). 
TD-learning
As stated above, one of the crucial differences between the Rescorla-Wagner 
learning rule and TD is that TD also considers stimulus presentations as carrying 
information about future reward. This is because a stimulus could signal a state 
transition to an individual, and the new state could predict more future rewards. 
The TD control algorithm that resembles the Rescorla-Wagner rule most is known 
as Q-learning. The important insight that TD algorithms such as Q-learning pro-
vided was captured by the Bellman Equation, which states that the value of any 
state s is a long sum over a series of expected future discounted rewards that can 
be obtained from that state (Daw and Tobler, 2013). If the average predictions of 
the Bellman Equation are faulty, the agent will observe a prediction error, and 
the sum of future expectations is updated in a very similar way to the Rescorla-
Wagner learning rule. 
Q-learning is very useful in situations where a sequence of choices leads to an 
eventual reward. In the studies in this thesis, the choices that are made almost 
always lead to immediate rewards, which allows for immediate updating of choice 
values. In addition, there is often no final goal to the tasks we use. Therefore, 
the expected future rewards in the decision-making processes that we model are 
approximated on a trial-by-trial basis by the Rescorla-Wagner rule. However, for 
5our analyses, we borrow the TD-learning assumption that states have values, so 
that stimulus presentation at the trial onset evokes a prediction error. Another 
element that we have borrowed from TD-learning is notation: it is conventional 
in RL to use Q to mean state-action values (the expected value Q that an agent 
has for choice a), whereas V reflects simple state values (the expected value V 
that an agent has for stimulus i). Q therefore becomes action-specific, whereas 
V is stimulus-specific. 
Bayesian observer models
Another approach to defining a value function is the use of Bayesian observer 
models (Daunizeau et al., 2010; Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011). Bayesian 
observer models are strictly speaking not within the RL paradigm, but can also 
provide estimates of values. Whereas models of the RL family estimate single value 
estimates for each option in the environment, Bayesian observer models provide 
a probability distribution around value estimates. The Bayesian observer is a 
theoretical entity that performs a task, taking into account the information about 
the environment, using Bayes’ rule to estimate what the posterior representation 
of the environment based on priors and the likelihood of obtaining the received 
reward under that prior. Bayesian observers track the probability distribution 
over expected values of outcomes, incorporating the notion of uncertainty about 
the environment, and weighting the observations about reward probability by 
the level of uncertainty about the environment. Bayesian models can be hierar-
chical: they allow for tracking not only of mean and variance on a trial by trial 
level, but also the dynamics of this process, i.e. they can incorporate the rate of 
change in variability, or volatility of the environment. 
After value estimation
In the computational models we use, agents perform actions. In doing so, they 
need to balance exploitation and exploration (Badre et al., 2012; Cohen et al., 2007; 
Dayan and Sejnowski, 1996; Frank et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2014). Exploitation 
refers to choosing the alternative for which the agent has computed the largest 
expected value. If the environment is stable, the same choice will repeatedly lead 
to the greatest reward, and minimal exploration is needed. In practice however, 
environments are volatile, and in order for exploitation to return the greatest 
rewards, the agent needs information about the value of all available action-state 
contingencies. Thus, the agent needs to explore the available actions. 
Regardless of what value function is used, the balance between exploitation and 
exploration is often formalised with a softmax function, which defines the prob-
ability that an agent will explore or exploit by translating the estimated value 
difference between the two into a choice probability function in favour of the 
6most valuable option, with some leeway for exploration depending on temperature 
parameter β (Figure 1). The softmax is an observational model or response model, 
a model that computes how value estimations lead to observed choices. In the 
interest of brevity, I will only discuss the softmax as an observational model, as 
it is very commonly used in RL (Daw, 2011; Sutton and Barto, 1998). 
The softmax shows that the probability that an agent chooses option 1 on the 
estimated value (V) for that choice, relative the action values of other choices 
(option 2 in Figure 1). In a situation where an agent is faced with two choices, 
the softmax rule favours the action with the highest action value, and assigns the 
largest choice probability to this action. The other options has a chance of being 
explored proportional to how valuable they are perceived to be. In the softmax 
above, β is an inverse temperature parameter, which allows for a larger or smaller 
differentiation between choice probabilities. β is usually individually fitted. If β 
is very large (as in the figure where β = 100), the probability of choosing the 
action with the highest action value will be relatively much greater than the 
probability of choosing the other alternatives. If β is very small (as in the figure 
where β = 1), the probability of all actions becomes nearly equiprobable, even 
with large value differences. Thus, β can be seen as an indicator of how much 
the agent‘s decision is based on value. This can reflect a tendency to explore (if 
β is low) or low interest in the task or in obtaining the highest valued choice. 
Figure 1. When the inverse temperature parameter β is large, small differences between 
options lead to deterministic behaviour. When β is small, the agent may explore the other 
less valuable options more. 
7Extensions of action propensities
When applying RL to cognitive neuroscience, one needs to define the learning 
process that is believed to have given rise to the observed data. In order to do 
this, one first decides which parameters are added to the value function. This 
more elaborate definition of the value function is called the learning model (Daw, 
2011). The learning model will reflect hypotheses about the algorithms that the 
brain uses to solve RL problems (Daw, 2011). When such parameters are added, 
the resulting action value is referred to as an action propensity. An example 
of a simple learning model is one where action propensities m are defined as 
. In this case, the learning model is reduced to the standard RW 
rule or TD algorithm as presented in equation 1. Usually however, models are 
expanded with additional parameters that affect action propensities, because the 
goal of defining a learning model is to understand how agents learn and to under-
stand their behaviour. Because humans do not always behave rationally, these 
value functions do not simply capture rational approaches to decision-making: 
often parameters are included that reflect common biases that make certain actions 
more attractive to agents, despite these biases leading to suboptimal performance. 
Examples of such additions include perseveration parameters, which reflect the 
common observation that people often tend to stick with the same choice, or 
avoid choice repetition, regardless of the calculated value difference between 
choices (Laskowski et al., 2016; Rutledge et al., 2009). Additionally, previous 
studies have included parameters that reflected different sensitivities to rewards 
and punishments (Guitart-Masip et al., 2014a; Kobayakawa et al., 2010), a go 
bias, for Go/NoGo paradigms, as well as a parameters reflecting motivational 
biases, which captures the tendency of individuals to pair actions with rewards 
and inactions with avoiding punishments (Cavanagh et al., 2013; Guitart-Masip 
et al., 2012a, 2014a; Huys et al., 2011, 2012; Swart et al., 2017). When research-
ers are interested in studying the exploration/exploitation balance, a parameter 
reflecting an exploration bonus may be included in the model definition (Dayan 
and Sejnowski, 1996; Frank et al., 2009). Similarly, if risk-taking is of interest 
to behaviour, a model parameter reflecting risk preference is commonly added 
to the value function (Niv et al., 2012; Rouault et al., 2019). 
Model definition
When deciding which learning model may have given rise the observed data, 
there are two ways in which the definition of the learning model needs to be 
specified. One is parameter estimation, the numerical estimation of different free 
parameters that go into the definition of the model, e.g. the value of the learning 
rate, forgetting rate, temperature or bias parameters. Note that the model here 
includes both the learning model and the observational model, as the temperature 
parameters are part of the observational model. These values are estimated by 
8calculating how likely the data would have been observed under different parameter 
values, giving rise to a likelihood, quantifying how well parameters fit the observed 
data. There are different approaches to parameter estimation. One approach is 
to perform a grid search, which requires trying out every possible combination of 
parameter values within a specified range. Grid searches will in practice result 
in the best fitting parameter values, but are computationally hugely taxing and 
very slow. For this reason, the most common approaches to parameter estimation 
involve gradient descent. This approach will transverse the multidimensional param-
eter space and calculate the log-likelihood for a combination of parameter values 
and its neighbours, and then travel in the direction where the gradient towards 
the lowest log-likelihood is steepest. In order to dictate which parameter values 
to consider, one can use priors, which put more prior probability on the range of 
values within the prior distribution. 
The other way in which the model needs to be defined is the parameters to include 
in the model, e.g. the decision of whether a forgetting rate should be included at 
all. This process is done by performing model comparison between different learning 
models. Model comparison is done by looking at all the likelihoods for different 
agents, and choosing the model that gives rise to the best likelihood overall, penal-
izing for the number of parameters to prevent overfitting using information criteria 
(Daw, 2011) such as the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) or Watanabe–Akaike 
information criterion (WAIC). 
Dopamine and the basal ganglia in value-based learning
As described above, Rescorla-Wagner and TD models within the computational 
framework of RL are often used to study value-based decision-making, because 
of how dopamine neurons in the midbrain respond to unexpected rewards and 
non-rewards. Dopamine’s function as a neurotransmitter was discovered in the 
1950s and soon after linked to symptoms of Parkinson’s disease (PD), a disease 
characterised by bradykinesia (Carlsson, 1959; Marsden, 2006). Research has since 
implicated the dopaminergic system in a range of cognitive and motor processes. 
These processes include control and invigoration of motor functions (Beierholm 
et al., 2013; Robertson et al., 2015), facilitation of high-level cognitive processes 
like working memory and cognitive flexibility (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011; Gruber 
et al., 2006; Sawaguchi and Goldman-Rakic, 1991; Takahashi et al., 2012), respon-
siveness to reward (Aarts et al., 2012; Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al., 1997), and 
learning from reward prediction errors (RPEs) (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Hart 
et al., 2014; Pessiglione et al., 2006). 
Value-based decision-making became a popular way of studying dopamine after 
Schultz et al., 1997 discovered with neurophysiology recordings in monkeys that 
unexpected rewards lead to a burst in activity in dopamine neurons located in 
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substantia nigra (SN). Schultz et al. (1997) observed that when a reward was 
expected, the reward-predicting stimulus caused a burst in activity in dopamine 
neurons at the time of this stimulus presentation (Cohen et al., 2012; Pan et al., 
2005; Schultz et al., 1997), but not at the time of reward delivery. The burst in 
activity in dopamine neurons after a predictive stimulus is presented is thought 
of as a TD RPE, as the animal is put from a neutral state in a rewarding state 
(Schultz, 1998). It is also thought to reflect an action invigoration signal, encour-
aging or discouraging the animal to respond to this stimulus (Hamid et al., 2016). 
Unexpected rewards, on the other hand, cause a burst of activity in dopamine 
neurons at the time of reward delivery, and unexpected reward omissions cause a 
dip in activity in dopamine neurons at the time of omission (Schultz et al., 1997). 
These bursts scale proportionally to the size of rewards (Tobler et al., 2005). The 
burst in dopamine neuron activity in response to unexpected rewards are com-
monly thought to represent RPEs at the time of reward delivery, resembling the 
computational prediction error δ as described in the RL section above. Since, many 
studies confirmed the existence of RPEs in the SN/VTA with neurophysiology 
recordings (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Cohen et al., 2012), although a debate 
about the ability of dopamine neurons to effectively signal negative RPEs exist 
(Bayer et al., 2007; Fiorillo, 2013). 
Neurons in SN/VTA releasing dopamine in response to RPEs project to different 
target areas in the brain, which has an effect on associative learning. One major 
 target is the striatum, consisting of caudate, putamen and nucleus accumbens 
(NAcc). The striatum is often roughly divided in a ventromedial to dorsolateral 
gradient, with the dorsal striatum connecting to premotor and motor cortical areas, 
and the ventral striatum (VS) connecting to cortical areas that mediate reward and 
emotional processing (figure 3; increasingly dark > increasingly ventromedial, 
(Haber and Knutson, 2010)). There are three major pathways through which dopa-
mine operates. First, the nigrostriatal pathway includes dopamine neurons in the 
SN pars compacta (SNc) that project to the dorsal parts of the striatum, involved 
in the control of movement. In PD, the nigrostriatal pathway is most affected. The 
other two pathways are thought to be involved in cognition, executive control and 
value-based decision-making: one is the mesocortical pathway, and connects the 
VTA to the prefrontal cortex (PFC) directly. The other is termed the mesolimbic 
pathway, and connects the VTA to the VS. Neural RPEs are thought to be expressed 
in the VS through the mesolimbic pathway (Arias-Carrión et al., 2010). 
In the striatum, medium spiny neurons (MSNs) express dopamine receptors and 
are responsive to dopamine release. dopamine binds to two families of receptor 
subtypes in MSN terminals: D1-like receptors (which the D1 and D5 receptor type 
belong to, from now on referred to as D1 receptors, D1-Rs) and D2-like receptors 
(which the D2, D3 and D4 receptor type belong to, from now on referred to as 
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D2 receptors, D2-Rs). D1 and D2-Rs respond to dopamine differently. Generally 
speaking, the binding of dopamine to D1-Rs has an excitatory effect on the post-
synaptic cell, increasing the likelihood that the neuron will fire. Conversely, when 
dopamine binds to D2-Rs, this has an inhibitory effect on the cell, reducing the 
likelihood of the cell to fire (Clark and White, 1987; Keeler et al., 2014). MSNs 
with D1 and D2 receptors are approximately evenly expressed in striatum, but 
segregated in different populations (Keeler et al., 2014).
D1-Rs are expressed by MSNs that form the direct pathway. D2-Rs are expressed 
by MSNs that form the indirect pathway (Keeler et al., 2014). Both pathways 
affect activity in thalamocortical projections, which are by default tonically 
inhibited, as a result of inhibitory projections from the internal globus pallidus 
(Figure 2). Activation of the direct pathway activates inhibitory projections to 
the internal globus pallidus. This decreases the tonically inhibitory pressure on 
the thalamus, leading to a facilitation of connections with the cortex. Activation 
of the indirect pathway via the subthalamic nucleus (STN) leads to activation 
of the internal globus pallidus and thalamus, which increases inhibitory firing 
of the thalamus, ultimately decreasing excitatory feedback to cerebral cortex 
(Arias-Carrión et al., 2010) and inhibiting connections with the cerebral cortex. 
D1 activation increases activation in the direct pathway, whereas D2 activation 
decreases activation in the indirect pathway (Frank et al., 2004). D1 and D2 
receptors are differentially responsive to tonic and phasic changes in dopamine. 
D2-Rs have high affinity to dopamine, and are therefore sensitive even to small 
and transient, or tonic changes in dopamine levels. In contrast, D1-Rs have low 
affinity, and are therefore most sensitive to large changes in dopamine levels 
(Marcott et al., 2014; Surmeier et al., 2011). Dopamine release from SN/VTA 
in response to positive RPEs is phasic and therefore primarily acts on D1-Rs 
and direct pathway, facilitating corticostriatal connections, whereas dopamine 
dips from SN/VTA in response to negative RPEs are tonic and act on D2-Rs and 
increase activity in the indirect pathway (Hikida et al., 2010). 
In the dorsal striatum, activity of dopamine neurons resulting from expectation of 
reward have the effect of increasing the likelihood of acting, as the direct pathway 
facilitates action selection (Wickens et al., 2003). However, the temporal speci-
ficity of dopamine release resulting from better than expected outcomes (RPEs) 
also leads to plasticity in the direct pathway, which has the effect of increasing 
the likelihood that the action that directly predated the unexpected reward is 
repeated. Conversely, a dip in dopamine results in the activation of the indirect 
pathway and the inhibition of motor output. Additionally, dips resulting from 
unexpected reward omissions or punishments leads to plasticity in the indirect 
pathway, which decreases the likelihood of repeating an action that led to reward 
omission or punishment next time the same circumstances are encountered 
(Collins and Frank, 2014). 
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This functional organisation of the circuit has inspired neural network models of 
learning to repeat actions that lead to reward and to inhibit actions that lead to 
punishment. For example, Frank et al. (2004), proposed a neural network model 
inspired by this architecture of the striatum and its modulation by dopamine that 
is able to perform various RL tasks (Frank et al., 2004). This model is largely 
supported by research findings, although the picture is not always consistent. 
For example, the effects of dopaminergic enhancement sometimes affects only 
reward learning (Beierholm et al., 2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012b; Pessiglione 
et al., 2006; Rutledge et al., 2009), and sometimes both reward and punish-
ment learning (Bódi et al., 2009; Cools et al., 2009; Guitart-Masip et al., 2014a; 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the direct and indirect pathway in the striatum. Red 
lines between areas represent excitatory connections, blue lines represent inhibitory connec-
tions. Glutamatergic neurons from the cortex project to MSNs in the striatum. These MSNs 
are also the target of dopaminergic projections from the SN/VTA in the midbrain. When 
dopamine binds to D1-Rs which form the direct pathway, the effect of this activation on 
postsynaptic neurons is excitatory. Thus, the GABA-ergic projections from the striatum to 
the GPi SNR are activated, which decreases the overall inhibitory pressure on the thalamus, 
and facilitates activation of the cortex. Activation of D2-Rs leads to an inhibitory effect on 
the postsynaptic cell, indirectly increasing the inhibitory pressure on the thalamus, implying 
that activation of both pathways leads to increased connectivity between the thalamus and 
the cortex. Figure adapted from Leisman et al., (2013). 
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Moustafa et al., 2008). The variability in findings are sometimes attributed to 
baseline dopamine levels (Cools et al., 2009; Cox et al., 2015; Swart et al., 2017) 
or genetic  modulatory factors (Frank et al., 2009; den Ouden et al., 2013). Other 
more elaborate models of the role of the two pathways in value-based decision-
making and action selection have been proposed by for example (Hwang, 2013; 
Keeler et al., 2014))
Although the direct/indirect pathway models are based on the findings on the  dorsal 
striatum, where the direct pathway facilitates action selection, and the indirect 
pathway facilitates inhibitions of actions (Wickens, 1990; Wickens et al., 2003), 
this functional organization of the striatum is conserved along the ventromedial 
to dorsolateral axis, with the exception of the NAcc (Kupchik et al., 2015), from 
which MSNs containing D1-Rs also project to the GPe. The striatum is interfaced 
with the cortex in a limbic-cognitive-motor gradient, with the most ventromedial 
areas being most responsive to value-related and cognitive signals elsewhere in 
the brain, and the most dorsolateral area receiving mostly input from premotor 
and motor areas (Haber and Behrens, 2014, Figure 3). This has led to the idea that 
the striatum functions as a selection device, promoting the selection of actions 
in the dorsal striatum, but the selection of cognitive processes, goals and mental 
representations in more ventromedial regions. 
In recent decades, the RPE signal has been extensively researched in humans 
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and value-based decision-
making tasks that implement RL as a computational framework. RPEs have been 
found to be represented in VS (Niv et al., 2012; Pagnoni et al., 2002; Pessiglione 
et al., 2006), an area in the brain to which the mesolimbic midbrain projects. 
However, not all fMRI studies demonstrate a signal in VS positively correlating 
with reward, and negatively correlating with expected value, as one would expect 
from a  canonical RPE signal (Chowdhury et al., 2013a; Wimmer et al., 2014). 
In human neuroimaging studies, neural signals in SN/VTA and VS in humans 
show a pattern of response incompatible with pure RPE signalling, as these sig-
nals were predominantly predicted by action requirements. RPEs in both the 
SN/VTA and VS humans were only observed when rewards were the result of 
actions, and not when rewards where the result of omitting an action (Guitart-
Masip et al., 2011). This observation is suggestive of a Pavlovian mechanism, 
which couples activation with appetitive cues, and inhibition with aversive cues 
(Guitart-Masip et al., 2014b; Haber and Behrens, 2014). The opposite (coupling 
activation with aversive cues, and inhibition with appetitive cues) is much more 
difficult to learn (Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012a). This 
mechanism is reminiscent of the functional anatomy of the striatum described 
above. The direct and  indirect pathway couples actions and reward reinforce-
ment with approach behaviour through dopamine release in response to reward 
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and reward-predicting cues. This reinforces the direct pathway, facilitating the 
learning and repetition of the recently executed action. Conversely, it couples 
inaction with the avoidance of punishment, by lowering dopamine release in 
response to punishment (and reward omission) and punishment-predicting cues. 
This reinforces the indirect pathway, preventing the repetition of the recently 
executed action and promoting delearning of the association between stimulus 
and action selection (Frank et al., 2004; Soares-Cunha et al., 2016). Recent stud-
ies have shown that the instrumental learning of actions in response to rewards 
is biased towards the coupling of action and valence (Chowdhury et al., 2013b; 
Guitart-Masip et al., 2012a), and that manipulation of the dopaminergic system 
can affect this bias (Guitart-Masip et al., 2014a; Swart et al., 2017), which is in 
line with this mechanism.
Figure 3. Schematic representation of prefrontal projections to the striatum. The top left 
image shows a sagittal plane of the brain, with the dlPFC, dACC and vmPFC coloured from 
light to dark yellow. The striatum is represented here in the middle of the brain in grey. The 
lOFC is located on the lateral surface of the prefrontal cortex. dlPFC, dACC, lOFC, and 
vmPFC are all part of the corticothalamostriatal loop complex. They project in that order 
from dorsolateral to increasingly ventromedial areas in the striatum (bottom right), where 
their projections converge. Activity in corticostriatal loops regulates reward processing and 
action selection. Adapted from Haber and Knutson, (2010).
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It is important to consider that dopamine does not act alone in the learning and 
reinforcing of actions leading to rewards or punishments. For example, the neuro-
transmitter serotonin (5-HT) has been suggested to be important for the inhibition of 
behaviour that leads to punishment and increased sensitivity to aversive outcomes 
(Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Cools et al., 2011; Daw et al., 2002; Geurts et al., 2013; 
den Ouden et al., 2013), forming an opponency axis with dopamine. There is also 
a range of evidence implicating 5-HT in punishment learning and risky choice 
(Rogers, 2011). Additionally, the neurotransmitter acetylcholine projects to many 
of the same structures as dopamine (Fobbs and Mizumori, 2014), and is thought to 
be important for many different types of cognition, including attention and memory 
(Picciotto et al., 2012). Noradrenaline is another abundant neurotransmitter that 
plays important roles in arousal, motivation and attention (Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2005). NA has also been suggested to signal an uncertainty prediction error, in a 
similar way that dopamine signals RPEs (Preuschoff et al., 2011). 
Basal ganglia – cortex interface
Cortical signals mandate the activity in the direct and indirect pathways in striatum, 
through roughly topographical glutamatergic cortical projections to the striatum 
(Haber and Behrens, 2014; Haber and Knutson, 2010, Figure 3). These afferent 
connections are modulated by dopamine in the striatum (Seamans and Yang, 2004).
These projections, together with the basal ganglia circuit, form cortico-striato-
nigro-thalamo-cortical loops (Haber and Knutson, 2010). Functionally different 
cortical areas project to different subregions of striatum, with functionally similar 
cortical areas projecting to similar parts of the striatum. Initially the idea emerged 
that several broadly functionally segregated and separate cortical loops existed, 
broadly divisible into limbic, associative and sensorimotor circuits. However, the 
idea that these loops are integrated recently received much support, based on 
the idea that in order for goal-directed action and adaptive behaviour to occur, 
reward evaluation, associative learning and developing motor execution plans 
are required (Haber and Knutson, 2010). 
This cortical input includes a range of regions which will be discussed in this 
section. Areas relevant to value-based decision-making include the ventromedial 
PFC and medial orbitofrontal cortex (vmPFC/mOFC), lateral OFC (lOFC, figure 3) 
and insula (Haber and Behrens, 2014; Rushworth et al., 2011). Examples of 
additional areas important for decision-making are dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) and 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), and frontopolar cortex (FPC) which will 
not be discussed in as much detail here. 
In humans, vmPFC/mOFC has been extensively studied in the context of reward 
learning (for reviews, see Bartra et al., 2013; Rushworth et al., 2011). In neuro-
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imaging studies, expected value signals as computed by a variety of computational 
models, are consistently observed in vmPFC during value-based decision-making 
tasks (Bartra et al., 2013). Damage to vmPFC/mOFC in humans and monkeys 
impairs value-guided decision-making (Camille et al., 2011; Halfmann et al., 2016; 
Noonan et al., 2010; Rudebeck and Murray, 2014; Rushworth et al., 2011). Some 
researchers have proposed that vmPFC tracks the value of items regardless of their 
nature, because vmPFC activation reflects the value across a range of tasks with 
different reward features from money to aesthetic and social rewards (Behrens 
et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2011; O’Doherty, 2007; Philiastides et al., 2010). Others 
have proposed that vmPFC performs value comparisons, because neural signals 
represent the value difference between alternative options (Boorman et al., 2009; 
Chau et al., 2014). Value is continually estimated in vmPFC, whereas in other 
areas of the brain, value computations appear to rely on knowledge or previous 
experience (Haber and Behrens, 2014; Janowski et al., 2013). This has led to the 
suggestion that vmPFC may be crucial for selection between alternatives, or at 
least the transition between valuation and choice selection (Jocham et al., 2012). 
The lOFC is another important area for decision-making in the frontal lobe. It 
is a highly interconnected with both sensorimotor and cognitive control regions 
(Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004), and could be subdivided into more specific areas. 
The function of lOFC has been much debated (for a recent review, see Stalnaker 
et al., 2015), but it is clear that lOFC, like vmPFC/mOFC, has a role in value 
learning. Whereas the vmPFC/mOFC is active in response to rewards of many 
different types, cells in lOFC have been shown to differentiate between different 
types of rewards (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2008). It has been proposed that 
lOFC is especially important for credit assignment: the process of associating 
expected values with different visual stimuli during association learning (Jocham 
et al., 2016; Rushworth et al., 2011; Walton et al., 2010). Additionally, lOFC can 
represent other aspects detailing a decision-making problem, such as the context, 
position and reward associated with objects (Farovik et al., 2015). 
Recently, the theory emerged that the combined structures of mOFC/lOFC may 
specifically represent a cognitive map of task-relevant state information (Schuck 
et al., 2016). This idea integrates the different findings presented by different 
researchers (Stalnaker et al., 2015), such as OFC encoding stimulus identity related 
to reward (Howard et al., 2015), but not related to stimulus identity regardless 
of outcome (Klein-Flügge et al., 2013; Schuck et al., 2016). 
The insula has been identified as another important area for decision-making. 
This is unsurprising, given its central position between cortical areas and the 
striatum, both topographically and functionally. The insula projects to the NAcc, 
and receives inputs from sensory as well as prefrontal cortical areas like the 
vmPFC (Haber and Behrens, 2014). Anticipatory activity in the insula has been 
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found to signal both anticipation of reward and punishment, and possibly reflects 
uncertainty (Oldham et al., 2018). Evidence from participants with brain dam-
age demonstrated that after damage to the insula, decision-making is impaired, 
especially in the aversive domain (Clark et al., 2008, 2014; Von Siebenthal et al., 
2017; Weller et al., 2009). Functional neuroimaging studies have found insula 
activation in the context of weighing losses and risky outcomes (Cox et al., 2008; 
Rudorf et al., 2012). The insula also likely integrates information with evaluating 
risk or uncertainty during decision-making (Singer et al., 2009). Additionally, 
whereas activity in the striatum reliably corresponds to positive RPEs, the insula 
is robustly active in response to aversive prediction errors (Garrison et al., 2013). 
dACC interfaces between reward networks (VS connecting to OFC, insula and 
vmPFC) and motor networks: dACC functionally couples with the motor cortex 
responsible for action execution when vmPFC signals the value for that action 
(Asemi et al., 2015). Therefore, dACC is commonly thought to integrate multi-
sensory evidence. Additionally, recent evidence suggests that ACC plays a role 
in belief updating, showing a simple preference between one action or another, 
updating beliefs about how beneficial each action is in real time (Hunt et al., 
2018). dACC is also important in overcoming actions costs and exuding the 
effort needed to achieve a reward (Croxson et al., 2009; Rudebeck et al., 2006). 
Another area integrated in this network is the dlPFC, which seems to largely play 
a role in focusing attention on different aspects of the task at hand (Hunt et al., 
2018). Lastly, the FPC has been found to play a role in balancing exploration and 
exploitation (Badre et al., 2012; Raja Beharelle et al., 2015), as discussed in the 
RL section above. Combined, these cortical areas combine value signals passed 
from striatum with information about the environment.
Dopamine in the cortex
In the cortex dopamine plays a different role than in the striatum. In PFC,  dopamine 
exerts effects on NMDA and GABA currents in PFC. D1-Rs are more abundant 
in PFC than D2-Rs (Hall et al., 1994). It has been proposed that D1-R activation 
augments the robustness of preferred representations in working memory (Seamans 
and Yang, 2004), although very high activation may reduce robustness, resulting 
in an inverted U-shape relationship between D1 activation and working memory 
performance (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011; Sawaguchi and Goldman-Rakic, 1991). 
Conversely, D2-R activation has been suggested to reduce robustness of working 
memory representations in the cortex, making them more susceptible to updating 
with new information (Seamans and Yang, 2004). Dopaminergic modulation of 
such flexible working memory updating has also been suggested to be dependent 
on D2-Rs in striatum (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011).
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Dopamine, decision-making and aging
As mentioned in the beginning of the introduction, aging has a profound effect 
on the integrity of the dopaminergic system, as well as the integrity of cortical 
areas, and the connection between them and subcortical areas (Samanez-Larkin 
et al., 2012). Thus, aging can be expected to have a widespread effect on value-
based decision-making performance as well. There is an abundance of literature 
that has investigated this. 
Value-based learning has been found to be impaired in older adults in multiple 
studies (Chowdhury et al., 2013a; Eppinger et al., 2011, 2015; Mell et al., 2005; 
Samanez-Larkin and Knutson, 2015; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2012; Weiler et al., 
2008). There are several value-based decision-making tasks one can consider for 
such observations. One example is reversal learning tasks, where participants have 
to choose the best option from a set of options. After a while, reward contingencies 
change, and participants need to reverse their choice contingencies accordingly 
until contingencies change again. Older adults perform worse on such tasks than 
younger adults (Mell et al., 2005; Schoenfeld et al., 2014). Additionally, older 
adults perform worse on probabilistic reward learning tasks, where participants 
are required to adapt to fluctuating reward payoffs. Within a RL framework, this 
manifests itself in a slower learning rate (α in the section on RL above) for the 
updating of stimulus values (Chowdhury et al., 2013a; Rutledge et al., 2009), or 
reduced sensitivity to punishments. 
The anatomy and function of the dopamine system provide an attractive expla-
nation for this deficit. A widely accepted theory is that age-related decline in the 
dopamine system results in a less pronounced RPE signal (Eppinger et al., 2011; 
Samanez-Larkin et al., 2014). This would lead to a less efficient teaching signal 
from the midbrain to the basal ganglia. One fMRI study provided evidence for this 
theory: older adults showed no expected value (Q) component to their RPE signal, 
unless their dopamine system was boosted with L-DOPA (Chowdhury et al., 2013a). 
Additionally, diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) results, which indicate the integrity of 
the white matter in the brain, showed that the integrity of the connection between 
SN and striatum accounted for this incomplete RPE (Chowdhury et al., 2013a). 
In addition to the decreased ability of the dopamine system to convey RPEs, 
 frontostriatal connections and frontal functioning are both important contributors 
to decreased value-based decision-making in older adults. Some studies suggested 
connections between frontal and striatal regions are another main culprit for defi-
cits in probabilistic reward learning in older adults (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2012; 
Vijver et al., 2016). 
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How can we study the dopaminergic system? 
In order to investigate the role of dopamine in decision-making, we need ways 
of studying the dopaminergic system in humans. There are several ways to study 
neurotransmitter systems in humans. Each have their upsides and downsides, 
and I will briefly lay out why using PET to study the dopaminergic system is of 
use here. 
One possible way of studying neurotransmitter systems is with pharmacological 
agents that have a known effect on a receptor of a certain type. A great benefit 
of these types of studies is the possibility to use every individual as their own 
control. This allows (with some caveats described below) for causal inference 
about the effect that the manipulation of a neurotransmitter system has. There are 
many different possible agents that can be used: there are agonists, that activate 
the receptor type of the target, or antagonists, that inhibit them. Other possible 
pharmacological agents are precursors of naturally occurring neurotransmitters, 
of which L-DOPA is an example (Bear et al., 2007).
Although of great value, there are several challenges with the use of receptor 
agonists and antagonists. As stated before, in order to observe a behavioural 
change, the same behaviour needs to be measured twice in the same individual. 
This could lead to retest effect in behaviour, which may be difficult to dissociate 
from the effect of the drug. Counterbalancing the order of placebo (or drug with 
an opposing function, e.g. an agonist) and treatment (e.g. an antagonist) can 
solve part of this problem, but the drug may also modulate the learning process 
of the behaviour that is investigated. This leads to potential problems with the 
baseline placebo condition in those participants who receive pharmacological 
treatment first (Rogers, 2011).
Another challenge is posed by the complicated pharmacology of some receptors 
targeted by pharmacological studies. Haloperidol is an example of a dopamine 
D2-R antagonist. If this drug is used to study the dopaminergic system in humans, 
we know that it will specifically antagonize dopamine D2-Rs (Frank and O’Reilly, 
2006; Pessiglione et al., 2006). D2 agonist such as haloperidol has been shown 
to have a vastly different effects for different dosages (Clatworthy et al., 2009; 
Huang et al., 2010), which sometimes depend on baseline measures of dopamine 
functioning (Cools, 2008; Cools et al., 2009). Most pharmacological studies only 
use one dose and compare the effects of that dose to placebo. Any changes in 
behaviour as a result of the manipulation can post hoc be explained as a result of 
these dosage effects. In order to dissociate these effects, researchers are required 
to also test participants’ baseline dopaminergic functioning with additional PET 
measures, cognitive proxies or genetic analysis (see below), or use a range of 
different doses.
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A challenge that both PET and pharmacological studies face is that radioligands, 
as well as agonists and antagonists will act on all receptor types available for 
binding in the brain. For example, D2-Rs exist both on the postsynaptic and 
presynaptic terminal. Because presynaptic D2-Rs are thought to downregulate 
dopamine release from the presynaptic terminal, D2-R antagonists could have 
opposing effects depending on their pre- and postsynaptic workings. This compli-
cates the scientific interpretation of results involving D2-R (ant)agonists (Frank 
and O’Reilly, 2006; Rogers, 2011; Soares-Cunha et al., 2016). Some studies have 
suggested that the pre- and postsynaptic workings, as well as the specific effects, 
may interact with the specific task circumstances, as well as with an individual’s 
cognitive, medication or genetic status (Soares-Cunha et al., 2016). 
Lastly, pharmacological challenges are global and it is therefore difficult to inves-
tigate specific effects of (for example) striatal and cortical dopamine receptor 
functioning. Although a single PET scan without drug challenges does not allow 
for causal manipulations, as pharmacological studies do, the resulting scan has 
very high spatial resolution. This allows researchers to draw conclusions about the 
baseline dopamine levels in specific brain areas, and how regionally specific levels 
of dopamine receptor availability may contribute to decision-making. Ideally, we 
would use multiple PET scans, genetic tests and pharmacological challenges to 
obtain a complete picture of dopaminergic functioning, but the resource-heavy 
nature of such an endeavour precludes such studies. 
In addition to (or in combination with) pharmacological manipulations, researchers 
can investigate neurotransmitter systems by investigating the relationship between 
behaviour and genetic polymorphisms that predict aspects of that neurotransmitter 
system. Common examples of such genes for dopamine include catecholamine-
O-methyltransferase (COMT) and DRD4 (which are related to levels of prefrontal 
dopamine), dopamine- and cAMP-regulated phosphoprotein (DARPP-32), DAT1 
and DRD2 (which are related to levels of striatal dopamine and striatal dopamine 
receptor density). Such studies have provided a great amount of insight in the 
interactions between genotypes and behaviour on a range of tasks (Frank and 
Fossella, 2011). 
The main challenge for such genetic investigations lies in the small effect that a 
single genetic polymorphism has in steering neural activity and behaviour. This 
implies that sample sizes in such studies need to be large, and the discovery of 
new genes that affect behaviour should be subject to careful scrutiny in relation 
to previous literature and the presumed mechanism at work. In addition, genetic 
effects interact with the environment and with other genes, which can compli-
cate the investigation of such effects, or allow for great post-hoc rationalization 
of any observed effects. Nonetheless, effects of all of the genetic polymorphisms 
mentioned above have been replicated across tasks and studies, demonstrating 
the value of this approach (for a review, see Frank and Fossella (2011)). 
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We used PET in the current set of studies, because we were interested in dis-
entangling the effects of cortical and striatal dopamine receptor availability. In 
addition, we wanted to investigate the age-related effects of dopamine receptor 
deterioration, into which genetic factors do not provide an insight. However, 
it should be noted that all three approaches (pharmacological manipulations, 
genetic investigations and PET studies) provide insights into the workings of the 
human dopaminergic system, and that all of them (ideally in combination with 
each other) should be used to expand our knowledge about it. 
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AIM OF THE THESIS
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the role of endogenous dopamine D1-R 
availability, and its age-related deterioration, in neural and behavioural mecha-
nisms of decision making. I present four specific sub-goals:
1. To study how aging affects neural processing (as measured with fMRI/BOLD) 
of value anticipation and RPEs in striatum and PFC and how these effects are 
related to the dopamine D1-R availability in cortical and subcortical regions.
2. To study how aging affects the structural connectivity between NAcc and PFC, 
how this structural connectivity is related to the expression of expected value 
in the cortex, and how the two affect value-based decision-making. 
3. To study how aging and dopamine D1-R availability are related to motivational 
biases during learning, and whether these biases are related to the dopamine 
D1-R availability in either cortical or subcortical regions, or both.
4. To study whether different anticipatory and outcome processing patterns of 
brain activity (as measures with fMRI/BOLD) during a valenced Go/NoGo are 
supported by dopamine D1-R availability in cortical and subcortical regions, 
and how aging affects these outcome processing patterns. 
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METHODS
Research participants and procedure
The studies that are a part of this thesis all use data from the same 60 partici-
pants in the dopamine and decision-making (DAD) sample. These include 30 
older (age 65-75 years, 12 females, mean age = 70.7 years, standard deviation 
(SD) = 2.75 years) and 30 younger (age 19-32 years, 18 females, mean age = 
24.2 years, SD = 3.44 years) participants. The research was performed at the 
Umeå Functional Brain Imaging Centre, and the Radiology Department at Umeå 
University. Ethical permission was obtained from the Umeå Ethical review board. 
All participants were right-handed, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Before recruitment into the study sample, candidate participants were screened 
by research nurses with the use of a screening questionnaire. Candidates were 
excluded if they had a history of substance abuse, mental illness, diabetes mel-
litus, or used more than 2 medications for arterial hypertension. All participants 
provided written informed consent prior to commencing the study. Participants 
were paid 2000sek (~$225) for participation in the study, and had the oppor-
tunity to earn additional money in each of the decision-making tasks (1 sek per 
obtained reward). 
Participants came in on two different days, with 3-44 days between them. On 
the first day, they performed two value-based decision-making tasks in a mag-
netic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner, and three decision-making tasks outside 
the  scanner, including all the tasks presented in this thesis. On the second day, 
participants performed three more decision-making tasks. On this day, they also 
underwent a PET/CT scan with the radiotracer [11C]SCH23390, a ligand that 
binds to dopamine D1-Rs. PET imaging failed for one older participant, due to 
the radiotracer not entering the bloodstream. In addition, one older participant 
felt unwell during the PET imaging and withdrew from that part of the study. 
Those participants’ fMRI and behavioural data are still included where possible. 
Study 3 includes data from two additional datasets. First, a dataset that was previ-
ously published in Chowdhury et al., 2013b. This dataset included 42 older par-
ticipants (age 64-75, 29 females, mean age = 69.1 years, SD = 3.44 years) and 
47 younger participants (28 females, mean age = 23.1 years, SD = 4.1 years). We 
used behavioural data on the learning version of the Go/No-Go task to validate the 
computational modelling analysis used in our own dataset. Second, a PET dataset 
previously published in Rieckmann et al., (2011). This dataset included 20 older 
participants (10 females, mean age = 70.4 years, SD = 3.12 years) and 20 younger 
participants (10 females, mean age = 25.2 years, SD = 2.21 years), for whom 
ROI data was available for a range of regions, imaged with [11C]SCH23390. We 
used dopamine D1-R availability data from this dataset to validate the principal 
component analysis performed in the DAD dataset used in study 3 and 4. 
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Task descriptions
This thesis includes studies that use performance on two different value-based 
decision-making tasks as an outcome variable: a two-armed bandit (TAB), and a 
valenced Go/No-Go task. I will briefly describe each task below.
The two-armed bandit task (figure 4) is a commonly-used task in decision-making 
research. Participants performed this task in the MRI scanner. Stimuli were pre-
sented on a computer screen that participants viewed through an angled mirror 
above their heads. At the start of each trial, participants were first presented with 
a fixation cross in the centre of the screen, and then two fractal images, which 
each representing one bandit “arm”. They could select one of the two arms through 
a button press. After the arm was selected, a rectangle would frame the chosen 
option, and after a variable interval (3000ms-RT), the outcome was presented 
on the screen. When the outcome was a reward, participants saw a green arrow 
pointing upwards. When the outcome was a reward omission, participants saw a 
yellow horizontal bar. If participants pressed the button after the response window 
had ended (3000ms), they saw a red X on the screen, and the text “you were too 
slow!” in Swedish. The next trial then started after the next inter-trial-interval. The 
outcome probability of receiving a reward for each arm varied over the course of 
the experiment according to a random Gaussian walk (figure 4). 
Figure 4. Top panel: schematic of the TAB and timing. Bottom panel: random Gaussian 
walks used in this TAB. 
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The probability of receiving a reward from bandit arm a on trial t was between 1 
and 100 percentage points, drawn from a Gaussian distribution (standard devia-
tion σ = 4) around a mean μa,t rounded to the nearest integer. We calculated the 
Gaussian walk identically to Daw et al., 2006: The starting value of the Gaussian 
random walk was equal to μa,1 , which was randomly drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution between 1 and 100. At each timestep t, the means μ for each bandit 
arm diffused in a decaying Gaussian random walk from this initial point, with 
 (3)
for each bandit arm a. The decay parameter λ was 0.9836, the decay center θ 
was 50, and the diffusion noise v was zero-mean Gaussian (standard deviation 
σd = 2.8) (Daw et al., 2006). Percentage points were divided by 100 to obtain 
probability values (figure 4). 
Participants were instructed to try and maximise the number of rewards during 
the duration of the task, and were aware that the probability of reward receipt 
could vary for each fractal image. Figure 4 summarizes the trial timeline for 
the experiment, and shows the random Gaussian walks used in study 1 and 2. 
The same Gaussian walks were used for each participant, but the assignment of 
Gaussian walk to bandit arm identity was counterbalanced between participants. 
In total, participants performed 220 trials, with a self-paced break after 110 trials.
The Go/No-Go task consists of four conditions. The four conditions were “go 
to win” (GW), “go to avoid losing” (GAL), “no-go to win” (NGW), and “no-go to 
avoid losing” (NGAL). Each trial started with the presentation of a single fractal 
image on the screen. Four possible different fractals could be presented, one for 
each condition. After the fractal, a target was presented, which could be on the 
left or right side, relative to the fixation cross. Participants then had to decide 
between performing an active choice, in this case a “go”, which entailed press-
ing a button on the side that they had seen the target, or an inactive choice, or a 
“no-go”, which entailed not pressing a button at all. Participants were explicitly 
instructed not to press on the side that the target was not presented on. If they 
did, responses were still counted as a “go”. 
The Go/No-Go task (figure 5) consisted of two phases, a learning phase (study 3) 
and an instructed phase (study 4). The learning phase was performed outside 
the scanner, where participants were seated in front of a laptop computer in a 
quiet room. Participants saw 45 trials of each condition during this phase. They 
were unaware of the correct choice-outcome contingencies, and were instructed 
that active or passive choices could be correct for each image. A fixed time after 
the choice was made, the outcome was presented on the screen. This would either 
be “win”, represented as a green arrow pointing upwards, “nothing”, represented 
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by a yellow horizontal bar, or “lose”, represented by a red arrow, pointing down-
wards. In the GW condition, active choices would lead to a win 80% of the time, 
and to nothing 20% of the time (and vice versa for inactive choices). In GAL, 
active choices would lead to nothing 80% of the time, and to a loss 20% of the 
time. Conversely, in NGW, inactive choices would lead to a win 80% of the time, 
and to nothing 20% of the time (and vice versa for active choices). In NGAL, 
inactive choices would lead to nothing 80% of the time, and a punishment 20% 
of the time. Fractal identities and conditions were randomized between partici-
pants. Figure 5 represents the experiment timeline, the different conditions and 
their outcome contingencies. They were instructed to find out through trial and 
error which choice was optimal for each image. Additionally, participants were 
aware that the outcome contingencies were probabilistic. 
Figure 5. The four conditions of the go/no-go task and the choice/outcome  contingencies. 
Targets were presented on the left or right side of the screen, and the side randomly 
 varied over the course of the experiment. In the learning phase, feedback was presented 
probabilistically with 80% reliability, in the instructed phase this was lowered to 70%. 
50% of the trials in the instructed phase ended after stimulus presentation. 
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After the learning phase, participants performed the instructed phase. Note 
that during the instructed phase, the probabilities of contingent feedback were 
changed to 70/30 instead of 80/20. Before starting the instructed task, par-
ticipants were explicitly instructed about the choice-outcome contingencies for 
each fractal, with a message on the screen displaying what the correct choice 
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was for each stimulus. After this instruction, participants performed 10 trials in 
each condition, where after the outcome was presented on the screen, they also 
saw text, explaining what the correct choice was for the preceding trial. After 
this, participants performed a block of 10 trials in each condition where half of 
the trials ended after stimulus presentation, and written feedback was omitted. 
The goal of this set of instructions was twofold: first, it was designed to ensure 
perfect performance in the next phase of the task, the instructed phase. Second, 
it familiarised participants with the fact that during the instructed phase, some 
trials would end before target detection. 
The instructed phase was performed inside the MRI scanner. Participants saw 
a total of 60 trials per condition during the instructed phase. Here, the same 
assignment of fractals to action-outcome contingencies was used as during the 
learning phase. 30 of the 60 trials were cut off after the presentation of the fractal 
(Figure 5, so-called “sham” trials), meaning participants never saw the target or 
the outcome. This was done to dissociate the action execution component from 
the anticipatory component during fMRI analysis. The total of 240 trials were 
randomized and presented in three blocks of 80 trials, with self-paced breaks 
in between. 
Computational modelling
The computational models are constructed to approximate the value-estimation 
process that is presumed to occur in the human brain. The action propensities 
( ) for each choice  on trial t in the two tasks were calculated 
according to one of the two learning model families, Bayesian and RL. These 
choice values were then entered into the softmax equation, which calculated the 
probability that choice c on trial t would be action a:
 (4)
Below I will briefly describe the most important models and the corresponding 
learning model for each task, and each considered dataset. However, in the analy-
sis procedure, we investigated the different combinations of parameters these 
parameters to obtain a fit. 
Two-armed bandit – Rescorla-Wagner (study 1)
We used two different families of computational models to model the TAB 
task data: Rescorla-Wagner models and Bayesian observer models. Although a 
Bayesian model outperformed the Rescorla-Wagner model in study 1 and 2, both 
families of learning model are useful for calculating action propensities on this 
task. Within the Rescorla-Wagner model family, the best model included the 
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Rescorla-Wagner updating rule for the chosen option, akin to the learning rule 
presented in the introduction:
 (5)
Where α was the learning rate, δt was the prediction error on that trial, and 
, reflecting each possible action, or each bandit arm. We included an 
additional parameter in the definition of : a perseveration parameter b (with 
-∞<b<∞). This parameter raises or lowers the expected value of a stimulus if 
that stimulus was also chosen on the previous trial. Thus, 
 (6)
where a positive value of b reflects a tendency to perseverate (repeat the same 
choice), and a negative value reflects avoiding perseveration. Lastly, a forgetting 
rate parameter φ was added to the updating rule for the unchosen option:
 (7)
Which determined the speed with which the value of a repeatedly unchosen bandit 
arm would be relaxed towards 0.5. 
Two-armed bandit – Bayesian observer model (study 1 
and 2)
In the Bayesian observer model, the probability of obtaining a reward for each 
possible action  (corresponding to each bandit arm) was represented as 
a beta distribution:
 (8)
The outcome on each trial lead to the updating of each distribution. From these 
distributions, we can mathematically derive the mean probability of obtaining a 
reward (which we refer to as (t), for consistency with the RL models) and the 
variance in reward probability ( ):
 (9)
 (10)
The starting values of the beta distribution parameters were set to 1 ( ). 
This implies that at the beginning of the experiment,  and maxi-
mum variance  reflecting a chance expectation of reward for 
both bandit arms and a maximum uncertainty about the underlying probability 
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distributions. If action a lead to a reward,  was increased by 1, and , H1–a, 
and Ha are relaxed towards 1. After a neutral outcome (reward omission), Ha was 
increased by 1 and ,  and H1–a are relaxed towards 1: 
 (11)
 (12)
For the unchosen bandit arm:
 
 (13)
ω and λ are individual participants’ free parameters that determine the speed 
with which reward probabilities are updated (ω, with 0 < ω < 1) and forgotten 
(λ, with 0 <  λ < 1). 
Beyond ω and λ, which determined the value of (t), two additional parameters 
were added to estimate the action propensity  for the two bandit arms. 
First, the variance of the bandit arm that was not chosen on trail t was added to 
the action propensity of that bandit arm on trial t + 1:
 (14)
If X > 0, choices with high variance are favoured and when X < 0, choices with 
high variance are avoided. Lastly, a measure of confidence was added to the 
value of the bandit arm that was not chosen on trial t. Relative confidence was 
defined as the probability that a sample drawn from the distribution for bandit 
arm a would be more likely to lead to a reward than a sample drawn from the 
distribution for bandit arm 1−a. This relative confidence, calculated at trial t, 
was added to the unchosen option at trial t + 1: 
 (15)
Where κ was an individually fitted parameter that weighted the relative con-
fidence . Relative confidence was calculated by calculating the probability 
that a random sample drawn from the beta distribution of bandit a would be 
more likely to lead to a reward than a sample drawn from the beta distribution 
of bandit 1-a.
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Given that our Bayesian observer model tracks subjective estimates of the full 
probability distribution of obtaining a reward for each bandit arm, the relative 
probability of one bandit arm being better than another can be approximated by:
 (16)
 (17)
Given the simple relationship between these two confidences, there are various 
essentially equivalent ways of incorporating it into choice. We considered the 
relative confidence in the choice on a trial:
 (18)
and assessed the extent to which the relative confidence on trial t–1 encouraged 
switching on trial t by adding a factor  to the action that 
was not chosen on trial t–1. Here, positive values of κ make the subjects more 
likely to switch if they had been more confident – i.e., reflecting a tendency to 
believe that the ‘grass might be greener on the other side’.
In the TAB, the Bayesian observer model outperformed the Rescorla-Wagner model. 
Go/No-Go – Rescorla-Wagner (study 3)
For the Go/No-Go task, we compared a range of models of the Rescorla-Wagner 
family only. Value computations for this task were calculated differently, because 
participants had the choice between performing a Go or a NoGo in response 
to each of four stimuli they were presented with, instead of a choice between 
stimuli. For that reason, we modelled the value of a “go” choice and a “no-go” 
choice separately for each stimulus. The result of the softmax computation would 
then be the weighted relative probability of performing a go, versus performing 
a no-go. In addition to including the action weight as in formula 1, we added an 
irreducible noise parameter [, which made the softmax rule robust to “flukes”, 
where participants would show a sudden diversion from action propensities. This 
parameter can also be referred to as a “lapse rate”. The altered softmax then reads:
 (19)
The action weight W(at,st), which was tracked for each action , with 1 
for “go” and 0 for “no-go”, and each state , reflecting the stimulus 
identity on that trial t. 
In order to keep the notation in this modelling section consistent with the publica-
tion (study 3), and because the learning rate and softmax temperature parameters 
30
are subject to modification by model parameters in the modelling of this task, I 
will use different symbols for these in this model compared to the TAB model. 
However, theoretically ε and ρ perform identical roles in this learning rule to α 
and β in the modelling of the TAB. All models we considered included the value 
Q of each action as determined by the Rescorla-Wagner updating rule:
 (20)
All models included a learning rate ε. Rewards, neutral outcomes and punish-
ments were entered in the model as . ρ reflected weighting of reward 
and punishment, determining the effective size of the reward or punishment. In 
some models, ρ took on separate values for rewards and punishments, assuming 
that forgoing a reward could be more or less aversive than obtaining a punish-
ment, a model definition that has been shown to consistently improve model fit 
(Cavanagh et al., 2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 2014a). A single value for ρ, sym-
metrically weighting rewards and punishments, would have the same effect as a 
single temperature parameter β as in equation 4. 
The effect we intend to capture modelling the go/no-go task is the slowed learn-
ing for passive choices that lead to rewards, and relative slower learning of active 
choices leading to avoiding punishments (compared to active choices leading to 
rewards and passive choices to avoid punishments). In order to do this, we add 
three additional parameters to the models in different constellations. 
First, go/no-go models included an individually fitted static bias parameter b that 
was added to the value of the action “go”, regardless of the potential reward of 
that trial type. Thus, for every trial type:
 (21)
Second, some go/no-go models included a Pavlovian term. This term added the 
expected value on the current state (Vt(st)) to the value of go choices. The term 
was weighted by an individually fitted Pavlovian parameter π: 
 (22)
where π ≥ 0.
For models that included a Pavlovian factor, V was computed as
 (23)
The Pavlovian parameter devalued the value of go choices in punishment condi-
tions, proportionally to the value of the stimulus (V(s)), which was negative in these 
instances. For rewards, the Pavlovian parameter boosted the value of go choices 
in proportion to the positive value of the stimuli that signalled potential rewards. 
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Finally, we added an instrumental learning bias N to some models. N modulated the 
participants’ learning rate H depending on whether the choice was active or pas-
sive, and subsequent feedback was positive or negative. In its most elaborate form, 
the value of this parameter was added to H on trials that resulted in a rewarded go 
response, and subtracted from H on trials that resulted in punished no-go choices. 
 (24)
The winning model for the main sample in study 3 included ρwin, ρlose, ε, ξ and 
Nrewarded-go. In this model, κ modulated ε only on rewarded go trials. Additionally, 
we reported the winning model in a dataset from a previously published dataset 
(Chowdhury et al., 2013b). In that dataset, the winning model included ρwin, ρlose, 
ε, ξ, π and N on rewarded go trials as well as punished no-go trials.
Model fitting
Model parameters for all tasks were fitted using the statistical procedure known 
as expectation-maximization. We used MATLAB’s fminsearch function to perform 
Laplacian approximation of a maximum a posteriori estimates for all parameters 
for all participants. The expectation step defined the probability distribution 
around a vector of means h and variances Σ:
 (25)
A = {Ai}Ni=1 represents all the actions by all the N subjects. N denotes a normal 
distribution and 6i(k) is the second moment around hi(k). h is a vector of param-
eter estimates (means) for participant i at step k. 6i(k) approximates the variance 
around the parameter estimates. Maximization then occurred in k steps, where
 (26)
Where at the starting point, θ ={m, v2} were the prior mean (0) and variance (22), 
which served a regularizing purpose for parameters, preventing them from taking 
on extreme values. Where appropriate, parameter values were transformed into 
model space with log and inverse sigmoid transforms: parameters constrained 
to be between 0 and 1 were transformed with an inverse sigmoid transform, 
and parameters constrained to be positive were constrained with a logarithmic 
transform. Updates for the mean and variance of the group level parameters on 
step k occurred as follows:
 (27)
 (28)
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Parameter values were considered for each participant’s decisions, until the dif-
ference between considered values stayed below 0.01 between steps, which was 
the requirement for model convergence. As stated above, in the first instance, all 
parameters started with Gaussian priors with mean=0 and SD=2. After that, the 
maximum a posteriori estimates of the group mean and variance were used as a prior 
for the next instance. In order to avoid local minima, we performed 10 instances of 
this model fitting procedure to obtain maximum a posteriori estimates, and selected 
the instance where the highest total likelihood for all subjects was obtained. 
Model selection
BICs were calculated for the instance where the maximum likelihood for each 
model was observed. As we believe all considered models to be equally likely 
a priori, we examined the model log likelihood log p(M|A) for each model M 
given all the data A directly, without considering a prior for model selection. 
The model log likelihood could be approximated in two steps. First, we approxi-
mated the integral over the hyperparameters at the group level, using the Baysian 
Information Criterion:
 (29)
where |A| is the total number of choices made by all subjects, and |M| is the 
number of parameters fitted, contributing to the penalty parameter for the iBIC. 
 is not the sum of individual likelihoods, but the sum of the integrals 
over the individual parameters. Therefore, we refer to this value as the BICint, or 
iBIC, with i for “integral”. This integral was approximated by sampling from the 
fitted parameter values:
log| | |  (30)
where K was set to 2000, and hk were parameter values drawn independently 
from the estimated maximum a priori estimate and variance of the group level 
hyperparameters.
PET imaging
Positron emission tomography (PET) is a neuroimaging technique that allows for 
the reconstruction and quantification of 3-D images that display neurochemical 
properties. During a PET imaging session, a radioactive tracer is injected into the 
bloodstream of the research participant. The radiotracer is a medical compound, of 
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which an atom has been replaced with a decaying isotope, in our case carbon-11 
([11C]). The medical compound will bind to the target it has been designed to bind 
to, in our studies dopamine D1-Rs. The isotope that is part of the tracer decays. 
Isotopic decay results in the release of positrons. These positrons usually travel 
a short distance in the tissue (<1mm), before encountering an electron. When a 
positron and an electron collide, both particles are annihilated, a reaction which 
causes two photons to be released in approximately opposite directions (180°) from 
each other. The PET scanner, which surrounds the area that is imaged, contains 
detectors that register these opposite photon emissions. From these registrations, 
a 3-D image is reconstructed. These different reactions across regions provide 
data on the total concentration of radioactivity in a certain area or interest. A 
time-activity curve (TAC) shows the average concentration of radioactivity in all 
voxels of a region of interest over several timeframes. 
PET image acquisition
PET images were acquired on a 690 PET/CT scanner (GE Medical Systems, WI, 
US). A low-dose helical CT scan (20 mA, 120 kV, 0.8s/revolution) was used for 
PET attenuation correction. Individually fitted thermoplastic masks were used 
to fixate the participants’ heads (Positocasts Thermoplastic; CIVCO medical solu-
tions, IA, US). At the time of an intravenous bolus injection of 200MBq of [11C]
SCH23390, a 55 minute dynamic acquisition started (9x120s, 3x180s, 3x260s 
and 3 x 300s), totaling 18 frames. Attenuation- and decay-corrected 256x256 
pixel transaxial PET images were reconstructed to a 25cm field-of-view using 
the Sharp IR algorithm (6 iterations, 25 subsets, 3.0mm Gaussian post filter). 
Sharp IR is an advanced version of the Ordered Subset Expectation Maximization 
(OSEM) method for improving spatial resolution (Ross and Stearns, 2010). The 
Full-Width Half-Maximum (FWHM) resolution was 3.2mm. This protocol resulted 
in 47 tomographic slices per timeframe, with 0.98x0.98x3.3mm3 voxels. Images 
were decay-corrected to the start of the scan.
PET analysis
We used a ROI-based protocol to estimate non-displaceable binding (BPND). 
BPND values were obtained by coregistering the PET time series images to the 
T1-weighted MRI images using SPM. From the T1-weighted images, we segmented 
ROIs using the FIRST algorithm as implemented by FSL (Patenaude et al. 2011). 
The cerebellum was segmented with the use of Freesurfer’s recon-all algorithm 
(Desikan et al. 2006) and used as a reference tissue due to the lack of dopamine 
D1-Rs in this structure (Hall et al. 1994). The average time activity curves (TAC) 
were extracted across all voxels within each ROI. Then, BPND was calculated with 
the use of the Logan method (Logan et al. 1996) as implemented in imlook4d 
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(imlook4d version 3.5, https://sites.google.com/site/imlook4d). BPND values were 
averaged across hemispheres for the NAcc. BPND values were taken as a proxy of 
dopamine D1-R availability. 
Definition of regions of interest for PET
Regions of interest were selected based on their relevance to decision-making 
in previous literature. In study 1, we used cortical regions of interest from the 
freesurfer recon-all parcellation pipeline. After visual inspection of the subcorti-
cal parcellation using recon-all, we performed an additional subcortical parcel-
lation with the FIRST algorithm implemented in FSL. This parcellation provided 
a  better fit to subcortical structures. Specific investigations of ROIs are discussed 
in the individual studies.
Principal Component Analysis
In study 3 and 4, we used a principal component analysis (PCA) to tease apart 
variance in dopamine D1-R signal from the PET data. Because BPND values in 
all the ROIs considered were highly collinear (correlation coefficients r>0.45, 
p<0.001), it is difficult to assess specificity when multiple significant correla-
tions between BPND values in ROIs and behaviour are observed. In order to obtain 
orthogonal and meaningful components, we performed a PCA, followed by a 
varimax rotation. Before performing the PCA, we age-corrected the BPND values, 
as age provides a large portion of BPND variability, and we were interested in 
capturing potential anatomical, functional or topographical patterns of organiza-
tion with our PCA (Haber and Knutson, 2010). BPND values were age-corrected 
by calculating the effect of age on the BPND and correcting for this effect in each 
ROI (Raz et al., 2004):
BPND-adj(participant) = BPND(participant) + βage*age(participant) (31)
The number of components to retain was determined with the use of a Catell-
Nelson-Gorsuch test (Cng) on the eigenvalues, done with the R package nFactors 
(function nCng, (Gorsuch, 2014)). Cng involves computing the slopes between 
the eigenvalues in the scree plot. The point at which the greatest change in slope 
is observed is the cut-off point for the number of components. 
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) is a non-invasive imaging technique that uses 
a magnetic field to construct 3d anatomical images. Creating an MRI image relies 
on the different magnetic properties of these anatomical structures. The scanner 
creates a strong magnetic field, within which a transient varying magnetic fields 
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are introduced using a radiofrequency pulse. This aligns the nuclei of the atoms 
inside the scanner into the same orientation. When this transient magnetic field 
is removed, the atoms in different anatomical structures take a different amount 
of time to relax into their original state (the spin-lattice relaxation time). In the 
brain, this measure is used to visualize the difference between white and grey 
matter. This contrast is also called the T1 contrast, and has been used in all of our 
studies for the segmentation of the brain into different ROIs for all participants. 
Diffusion-weighted imaging (DWI)
Diffusion-weighted imaging is a type of MRI. The goal of DWI is to measure the 
directionality of water molecules’ movement (also called anisotropic diffusion) 
in the brain’s white matter microstructure. The assumption is that stronger aniso-
tropic diffusion of the water molecules indicates higher structural integrity of the 
white matter microstructure, such as the myelin and the glial cells surrounding the 
neurons’ axons. Instead of a single radiofrequency pulse, during a DWI sequence, 
radiofrequency pulses are applied in a number of directions (32 in study 2 in 
this thesis). These radiofrequency pulses are then relaxed, and the shift of the 
water molecules between the radiofrequency pulses is measured. This shift can 
be represented as a 3d ellipsoid called a tensor, which has a Cartesian x, y and 
z direction in each voxel, of which the three main directions are represented as 
three eigenvalues. As the main outcome measure of white matter microstructure 
integrity we use Fractional Anisotropy (FA), defined as the intravoxel preferred 
directionality of water molecule translational random motion. This is expressed 
as a ratio ranging from 0 to 1, with 0 being isotropic (non-directional) and 1 
being unidirectional. FA is the normalized mean of the three eigenvalues of the 
tensor as obtained from the DWI sequence:
 (32)
Where λ
̯
 is the average of the three eigenvalues, and λ1, λ2, and λ3 are the three 
eigenvalues (Hagmann et al., 2006). 
DWI preprocessing and analysis
Diffusion weighted scans were corrected for motion and current-induced distor-
tions with FSL’s eddy_correct. To further correct for geometric distortions the 
images were non-linearly aligned with the T1-weighted structural scan (Wu 
et al., 2008) with the ANTs software (“ANTs by Stnava” 2019). Tractograms were 
generated with the MRtrix software (Tournier et al., 2012) and filtered with the 
SIFT2 method (Smith et al., 2015), using anatomically-constrained tractography 
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(Smith et al., 2012). We specified the two inclusion regions of interest (vmPFC 
and NAcc) as binary mask images, and accepted only streamlines that traversed 
both inclusion regions. We sampled until we recovered 100 streamlines between 
the vmPFC and NAcc regions of interest. Subjects were excluded if >200 million 
streamlines were considered, but less than 20 were selected as probable (n=11). 
FA maps were calculated using FSL’s dtifit. The tract formed by the reconstructed 
streamlines was used to mask the FA image, and the average within the tract 
became the individual’s measure of accumbens-to-frontal white matter integrity.
fMRI
When we try to understand the brain, we would like to know which neurons 
are active during a range of cognitive processes. The ultimate measure of neu-
ronal activity is to record it directly from firing neurons inside the living brain. 
Unfortunately, techniques that allow for the recording of activity directly from 
cells (single-cell recordings) are hugely invasive and almost never used in humans 
(although becoming more common with the emergence of intracranial electro-
encephalography (EEG) (Shokoueinejad et al., 2019)). With functional MRI, a 
proxy for neuronal activity is measured with the Blood-Oxygen-Level-Dependent 
(BOLD) contrast (Ogawa et al., 1990). This is a widely used technique in cogni-
tive neuroscience. The BOLD contrast makes use of oxygen consumption as a 
proxy for energy expenditure in the brain. As cells consume oxygen, the relative 
concentration of oxygenated and deoxygenated blood in the blood flow towards 
those cells changes. Because oxyhemoglobin and deoxyhemoglobin have different 
magnetic properties, this change in relative concentration can be measured with 
functional MRI (fMRI). We applied fMRI and the BOLD contrast in study 1 and 4. 
fMRI acquisition
Brain images were acquired on a MR750 3T scanner (GE Medical Systems, WI, 
US), equipped with a 32-channel phased-array head coil. T1-weighted 3D-SPGR 
images were acquired using a single-echo sequence (voxel size: 0.5 x 0.5 x 1 mm, 
TE = 3.20, flip angle = 12 deg). Diffusion weighted imaging scans were acquired 
with a spin-EPI T2-weighted sequence (64 slices, voxel size = 1 x 1 x 2 mm, TR 
= 8000 ms, TE = 84.4ms, FoV = 25 cm, flip angle = 90°), using 3 repetitions, 
with 32 independent directions (b = 1000 s/mm2) and six b=0 images. Functional 
images were acquired using a T2*-sensitive gradient echo sequence (voxel size: 2 
x 2 x 4 mm, TE = 30.0 ms, TR = 2000 ms, flip angle = 80°), and contained 37 
slices of 3.4 mm thickness, with a 0.5 mm gap between slices. Volume acquisition 
occurred in an interleaved fashion. 330 volumes were obtained for each of the two 
functional runs in study 1 and 2, and 210 volumes were obtained for each of the 
three functional runs in study 4. During acquisition of fMRI time series, heart rate 
and respiratory data were collected using a breathing belt and a pulse oximeter.
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fMRI analysis
fMRI analysis was performed in study 1, and in study 4. In house software (dico-
m2usb, http://dicom-port.com/) was used to de-identify all neuroimaging scans. 
Functional MRI analyses were performed in SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm/software/spm8/). The preprocessing pipeline included slice-time correction, 
realignment, coregistration to the T1-weighted image, movement correction 
and normalization to MNI space. For normalization, we used a diffeomorphic 
registration algorithm (DARTEL (Ashburner 2007)) with spatial resolution after 
normalization 2 x 2 x 2 mm. Data were smoothed with a final Gaussian kernel 
equivalent to a standard 8 mm (see below). The fMRI time series data were high-
pass filtered with a 128s cut-off, and whitened with an AR(1) model. For each 
participant, the canonical hemodynamic response function was used to compute 
their statistical model.
During the preprocessing of study 1, movement parameters produced by SPM’s 
coregistration algorithm showed that 15 participants moved >3 mm in any 
direction during functional runs of the TAB, a common observation for older 
cohorts (Churchill et al., 2017). To correct for movement artifacts produced 
as a consequence of this, we used the ArtRepair toolbox (Mazaika et al. 2009; 
Levy and Wagner 2011) for study 1, 2, and 4. ArtRepair compares the amount 
of motion between volume acquisitions based on the mean intensity plot of 
all functional scans, and linearly interpolates scans in which motion exceeds a 
specified threshold. We used the recommended threshold value of 1.5% devia-
tion from the mean intensity between scans. The average number of interpolated 
scans for our participants was 12.2 (1.8%) (SD = 19.6 (3.0%)) in study 1, and 
14.0 (2.2%) (SD = 26.6 (4.2%)) in study 4. One participant was excluded from 
both fMRI tasks for showing movement >1.0 mm in >25% of scans, in line with 
ArtRepair’s recommendations. ArtRepair smooths the individual subject data 
with a Gaussian smoothing kernel of 4 mm before normalization and movement 
correction. A Gaussian kernel of 7 mm was then used for the normalization to 
MNI space, resulting in a smoothed, normalized image equivalent to a standard 
8 mm smoothed normalized image.
For all GLMs, SPM motion regressors were added to the design matrix as regressors 
of no interest. Additionally, 18 parameters correcting for physiological noise as 
recorded by a heartbeat detector and breathing belt during the scanning sessions. 
These were calculated using the PhysiO toolbox version r671 (https://www.tnu.
ethz.ch/en/software/tapas.html).
First-level analyses are described in more detail under the individual studies. 
All second-level maps were produced with a family-wise error (FWE) voxel and 
cluster-corrected threshold at p<0.05, with a minimum cluster size of k=10. 
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Statistical analyses
In study 1, we used independent sample one-tailed t-tests to assess group differ-
ences in task performance, based on previously reported observations of impaired 
value-based decision-making performance in old age (Chowdhury et al., 2013a; 
Eppinger et al., 2011, 2015; Mell et al., 2005). Non-parametric independent 
two-tailed two sample Mann-Whitney tests were used to assess group differences 
in model parameters and other variables that were non-normally distributed. 
Two-tailed two-sample t-tests were used elsewhere. Pearson’s correlations were 
used to analyse the data further, controlling for age and model fit, as defined 
by the participant’s log likelihood, where appropriate. Statistical analyses were 
performed in SPSS.
In study 2, we used linear regression models, using the lm function in the R stats 
package. We predicted the strength of the value signal in vmPFC from 1) age, 
2) dopamine D1-R availability in NAcc, and 3) fractional anisotropy in the tract 
between vmPFC-NAcc. Additionally, we predicted behavioural performance from 
the same three predictors, as well as 4) the strength of the value signal in vmPFC. 
Linear models were compared using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). 
In study 3, we investigated the interaction between action and valence with a 2 x 2 
type III ANOVA using the afex package in R. The proportion of correct responses 
was the dependent variable, and action and valence independent within-subject 
variables with two levels (go/no-go and win/lose, respectively). To quantify the 
bias and study its relationship with D1-R availability measures, we calculated 
the overall action by valence interaction, reflecting the bias effect on the four 
conditions (GW + NGL – GL – NGW) and the bias effect on “win” conditions 
(GW – NGW). Two other behavioural measures reflecting the motivational bias 
were the instrumental bias parameter N, and the overall performance on NGW. We 
then performed Pearson’s correlation analysis between these behavioural scores 
and component scores of our PCA. We performed 10,000 permutations where 
we shuffled the values of the four measures of behavioral biases within partici-
pants and correlated these shuffled columns with the dopamine D1-R component 
loadings. The maximum t statistic from the four correlations in each iteration 
(four columns with shuffled values) was saved and added to the null distribution. 
This created null distributions that take into account the correlations between 
the measures of behavioral bias, and corrected for multiple comparisons taking 
this fact into account. Correlations in the data with an absolute t statistic that 
exceeded the absolute t statistic at the 95th percentile of this new null distribu-
tion were considered significant. Adjusted P values were calculated by counting 
the number of t values in the new null distribution that exceeded the observed 
t value, divided by 10,000.
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In study 4, we used 2x2x2x3 MANOVAs to investigate the interactions between 
action, valence, group and dopamine D1-R availability. Parameter estimates were 
mean corrected and entered into the MANOVA. For significant interactions with 
dopamine components, individual bivariate correlations (and partial correlations 
controlling for age) were performed as follow-up analyses. 
Exclusion and analysis samples for different studies
Not all 60 participants were included in all four studies. 
In study 1, 3 participants were excluded from the fMRI sample. One was excluded 
due to not varying their choice behaviour on the TAB at all, one because of a mal-
functioning button box, and one because of excessive head motion. The total final 
sample was 27 older participants and 30 younger participants (26 and 30 for PET). 
In study 2, 12 additional participants were excluded due to the failure of white-
matter tract reconstruction. The total final sample for this study was 23 older 
participants and 23 younger participants (22 and 23 for PET).
In study 3, those participants who performed badly on the task (as separated 
out by a 2-means clustering analysis based on GW performance) were initially 
excluded from behavioural analysis. In the main paper, 24 younger and 17 older 
participants were included (28 older and 30 younger for the PET analysis). 
In study 4, bad performers were excluded from analysis. The final sample for 
this study included those participants whose performance exceeded 70% correct 
in each of the four conditions in the task, and were not the same participants as 
those reported in study 3. The final analyses include 28 younger and 17 older 
participants. This threshold was set based on what we judged to be good perfor-
mance and is arbitrary.
For study 1 and study 2, a number of participants were excluded for technical 
reasons. However, in study 3 and study 4, a relatively large number of participants 
were excluded due to low performance on the valenced Go/No-Go task (see Task 
Descriptions). Exclusion was done before data analysis wherever possible, and as 
much as possible motivated by previous literature, and what we believed to be 
appropriate sample characteristics in light of the research question. In study 3, 
exclusion was done blindly by performing a two-mean clustering analysis. In 
study 4, I wanted to study action and inaction anticipation and processing in 
participants who were fully aware of task requirements. If task performance is 
very low, that is a strong indication that participants were not fully aware of 
task requirements, and that the participants are not anticipating what the fractal 
images instructed them to anticipate.
40
Statistical disclosure statement
Several iterations of participant selection and exclusion can contribute to “researcher 
degrees of freedom”. This refers to the number of possible different variations of 
data collection and analyses that can be done as a result of the common practice 
of making decisions about data collection and analysis while research is ongoing. 
Intentional or unintentional questionable research practices can arise because of 
such decisions, which may only be followed through if the consequence of the 
decision yields statistical significance (Simmons et al., 2011). Participants were 
not excluded (and should never be excluded) because initial results did not match 
my hypotheses. However, I am aware that unconscious biases and justifications 
may still have influenced my decision to exclude certain participants, or choose 
certain analyses (Meehl, 1967). I have tried to counter this by showing analy-
ses with and without covariates. In addition, I have reported the similarities or 
differences between important analyses in full and partial samples. In addition, 
below I provide a transparent summary of the analyses that were not reported in 
the articles or manuscripts, but that were performed. Although not perfect, this 
will allow the reader to more fully gauge the evidential value of the results, as 
preregistration reports are lacking. 
In study 1, all fMRI analyses were initially performed without the motion correc-
tion step during the preprocessing stage. In addition, during the computational 
modelling analysis, I tried additional computational models that were not reported, 
of the “win-stay-lose-shift” family, which provided a worse fit to behaviour. I also 
attempted to decode stimulus identity from the orbitofrontal cortex using a sup-
port vector machine, which was unsuccessful. These analyses were not reported. 
Finally, I performed a GLM analysis on the fMRI data using neural activity related 
to switching behaviour and confidence. This was part of the initial manuscript, but 
was removed at the review stage. A copy of the reviewer comments and response 
to reviewers clarifying this decision is published together with the article on the 
eLife website.
In study 2, all of the performed analyses are reported.
In study 3, I initially attempted to fit a structural equation model to the PET data, 
after which I switched to the PCA that is reported in the paper. The results of the 
structural equation modelling are not reported.
In study 4, I also performed the fMRI analysis with temporal derivatives included 
in the GLM. I attempted a searchlight RSA analysis within the striatum, to try and 
find voxels that represented the action by valence interaction, which was unsuc-
cessful. Additionally, I performed a hierarchical Bayesian regression analysis to 
estimate individual parameter estimates that reflected the extent to which people 
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represented anticipatory signals related to action, valence and the interaction 
between them in the different regions of interest I report in the current paper. I 
correlated these estimates with component scores of the PCA reported in study 3 
and 4. Lastly, I performed a partial least squares analysis to obtain neural patterns 
of action and valence anticipation. None of these analyses yielded statistically 
significant or clearly interpretable results, and are not reported. 
Throughout the years it took to complete the work in this thesis, I have increas-
ingly realised the extent to which researcher degrees of freedom affect the qual-
ity and reproducibility of research and scientific reporting. Especially during 
the  earlier works in this thesis, I may not have been as aware of the pitfalls of 
scientific enthusiasm (Gelman and Loken, 2013) as I am now. Although I stand 
behind the work and analyses done for this thesis, I believe that scientific prac-
tice in general and my own future research in particular could benefit from more 
narrowly specified and, ideally, preregistered analysis pipelines and hypotheses, 
as well as the publication of null results and (un)successful replication attempts.
Data and code availability
For study 1, all the data and code needed to reproduce the results are available 
at https://elifesciences.org/articles/26424. 
For study 2, the code used to create the figures and the manuscript is available 
at https://github.com/liekelotte/DWI.
For study 3, the code for the computational modelling is available at https://
github.com/liekelotte/GNG-models and the code and data for the PCA is posted 
at https://github.com/liekelotte/PCA-D1. 
For study 4, analysis scripts will be made available upon submission of the 
manuscript.
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INDIVIDUAL STUDIES
Study 1
Attenuation of dopamine-modulated prefrontal value signals underlies 
probabilistic reward learning deficits in old age
Study 1 was published in September 2017 in the journal eLife, with co-authors 
Jan Axelsson, Lars Nyberg, Peter Dayan, Katrine Riklund, Lars Bäckman and 
Marc Guitart-Masip. 
Aim
Dopamine decline has been suggested to be part of the reason for worse probabilistic 
reward learning observed in older people, affecting neural processing in prefrontal 
cortex, striatum or both. Previous studies have found that RPE signals in the NAcc 
of older adults lack an expected-value component. Other brain activity important 
for reward processing and decision-making includes activity in vmPFC. To inves-
tigate which neural mechanism is affected by aging, we compared behaviour and 
brain activity of older participants during a probabilistic reward learning task that 
evokes RPEs to the behaviour and brain activity of younger participants performing 
the same task. To investigate the role of dopamine in the signalling of RPEs and 
value signals elsewhere in the brain, we also measured D1-R availability with PET. 
Methods
We used a Two-Armed Bandit task (TAB), which participants performed in an 
fMRI scanner. The task required participants to pick one of two stimuli, and the 
payoff probability for each stimulus varied over the course of the experiment. 
We used computational modelling to quantify behaviour and generate expected 
value signals for the fMRI analysis. We looked at brain activity correlating with 
obtained reward and expected value, as well as the combination of the two, rep-
resenting RPEs. We also used PET to measure dopamine D1-R availability. We 
estimated three first-level general linear models for fMRI. GLM 1 was set up to 
investigate how value anticipation is represented in the brain and how this rep-
resentation differs between age groups. GLM 2 (with one parametric modulator 
for the putative RPE) and GLM 3 (with two parametric modulators (R and Q) for 
the canonical RPE) were set up to investigate the differences in the expression of 
the RPE signal at the time of outcome presentation in the old and young sample. 
After extracting parameter estimates from the relevant clusters, we investigated 
the relationships between these neural signals and dopamine D1-R availability 
with correlation analyses. 
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Results
Figure 6. left: difference in task performance between young and older participants. 
Younger participants earned more money on the TAB on average (t(49) = 1.69, p(one-
tailed)=0.048). middle: Behavioural performance was significantly predicted by the 
strength of the BOLD signal reflecting expected value (Q) in vmPFC (r(53) = 0.37, 
p=0.006 when controlling for age and model fit). For display purposes, the correlations 
are shown with residuals after regressing out age. right: dopamine D1 BPND in NAcc is 
positively related to Q in vmPFC (r(53) = 0.28, p=0.038, when controlling for age). 
For display purposes the correlations are shown with residuals after regressing out age.
We found that anticipatory value signals in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) 
were attenuated in older adults. The strength of this signal predicted performance 
beyond age and was modulated by dopamine D1-R availability in NAcc. We did 
not observe a difference between age groups in the representation of RPEs. 
Conclusion 
These results uncover a value-anticipation mechanism in vmPFC that declines 
in aging, and that this mechanism is associated with dopamine D1-R availabil-
ity in the NAcc. These results provide insights into the neural and behavioural 
under pinnings of probabilistic learning and highlight the mechanisms by which 
age-related dopaminergic deterioration impacts decision making.
Study 2
Corticostriatal white matter integrity and dopamine D1 receptor avail-
ability independently predict age differences in prefrontal value signaling 
during reward learning 
Study 2 is currently under review. Co-authors are Benjamin Garzon, Jan Axelsson, 
Katrine Riklund, Lars Nyberg, Lars Backman and Marc Guitart-Masip. 
Aim
Previous studies have found that the white matter tract that connects medial 
PFC with NAcc degrades in aging, and that this degradation can account for 
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the decline in probabilistic reward learning. This matches well with our finding 
from study 1, which showed that dopamine D1-R availability in the NAcc could 
predict the strength of value signals in vmPFC, which in turn predicted perfor-
mance. Our aim for study 2 was to investigate integrity of the white matter tract 
between NAcc and vmPFC using diffusion tensor imaging (DTI). The questions 
we answered is whether the integrity of these white matter tracts mediates the 
effect that the dopamine D1-R density in NAcc has on value representation in 
the vmPFC as described in study 1, or whether it independently contributes to an 
attenuation in vmPFC value signal. Additionally, we investigated the relationship 
between this white matter tract and performance on the TAB.
Methods
We used the same PET and fMRI data that we used in study 1. Participants per-
formed the TAB in an fMRI scanner. The task required participants to pick one of 
two stimuli, and the payoff probability for each stimulus varied over the course 
of the experiment. We used the behavioural, computational and fMRI results 
from study 1. In addition, we performed deterministic tractography analysis, and 
calculated fractional anisotropy in the white matter tracts that connect vmPFC 
with NAcc. Then we predicted 1) the performance on the task from value signals 
in vmPFC, dopamine D1-R availability in the accumbens, and FA in the tract 
between accumbens and vmPFC, as well as 2) the strength of the value signal 
in vmPFC from age, dopamine D1-R availability in the NAcc and FA in the tract 
between accumbens and vmPFC. We expected that white matter integrity in the 
vmPFC-NAcc tract would predict performance beyond age and mediate the effects 
of D1-R availability in NAcc on vmPFC value anticipation.
Results
Figure 7. left panel: We found that fractional anisotropy in the pathway between 
NAcc and vmPFC was significantly higher in younger compared to older participants 
(Myoung(SD)=0.34 (0.03), Mold (SD)=0.31 (0.02), t(40)=5.00, p<0.001)). right 
panel: FA values in the pathway between NAcc and vmPFC were significantly corre-
lated to the value-anticipatory activity in vmPFC (r=0.48, p=0.001). This correla-
tion survived correction for age (p=0.01).
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Table 1. Standardized coefficients and 95% confidence intervals predicting the 
expected-value signal in vmPFC. FA in the pathway between vmPFC and NAcc 
 predicted the strength of the anticipatory value signal in vmPFC independently 
from age and from D1-R availability in NAcc. 
Dependent: Q in vmPFC ȕFRHIILFLHQW 95% confidence interval p-value
age 0.30 -0.17 – 0.76 0.211
FA in vmPFC-NAcc 0.48 0.12 – 0.69 0.006
D1 BPND in NAcc 0.41 -0.00 – 0.82 0.052
Adjusted R2 = 0.256, model p = 0.002.
Table 2. Standardized coefficients and 95% confidence intervals predicting 
performance. Only the expected-value signal in vmPFC significantly predicted 
performance on the TAB. 
Dependent: wins ȕFRHIILFLHQW 95% confidence interval p-value
age -0.33 -0.82 – 0.16 0.176
Q in vmPFC 0.54 0.22 – 0.86 0.002
FA in vmPFC-NAcc -0.11 -0.49 – 0.27 0.550
D1 BPND in NAcc -0.20 -0.64 – 0.24 0.373
Adjusted R2=0.228, model p=0.006.
Conclusion 
These results build on the result in study 1, showing that a value-anticipation 
mechanism in vmPFC is associated with dopamine D1-R availability in the NAcc 
and FA in the tract between vmPFC and NAcc beyond the effect of age. This adds 
to a mechanistic understanding of age-related differences in probabilistic reward 
learning ability.
Study 3
Dorsal striatal dopamine D1 receptor availability predicts an instrumental 
bias in action learning 
Study 3 was published in January 2019 in the journal Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences (PNAS), with co-authors Jan Axelsson, Lars Nyberg, Rumana 
Chowdhury, Raymond J Dolan, Katrine Riklund, Lars Backman and Marc 
Guitart-Masip. 
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Aim
Dopaminergic manipulation with L-DOPA has been shown to modulate a learning 
bias that favours the coupling of action and valence. The locus of this modulation 
has been a matter of debate. We investigated the locus of endogenous dopamine 
modulation on motivational biases during learning.
Methods
We used a valenced go/no-go task, which participants performed outside the  scanner. 
The task elicits a motivational bias. We investigated the nature of this bias with 
computational modelling. We also used PET to measure dopamine D1-R avail-
ability and performed factor analysis on the binding potentials in a selection of 
four cortical (limbic cortex, frontal associative areas, inferior parietal lobe, motor 
cortex) and three striatal (NAcc, caudate, putamen) ROIs after correcting for age. 
We hypothesised that dopamine D1-R availability in the striatum would predict 
the extent to which individuals show a motivational bias in the valenced go/no-go 
task, and that cortical D1-R availability would be negatively related to this bias.
Results
Our PCA provided a three-component solution which demonstrates that cortical, 
dorsal striatal and ventral striatal dopamine D1-Rs provide separate, independent 
sources of variance in dopamine receptor availability as measured by [11C]SCH23390. 
Table 3 displays the component scores for each ROI. We replicated this factor solu-
tion in an independent dataset. Using computational modelling, we characterized 
the motivational bias in our sample as of instrumental nature. Only the inter-indi-
vidual variation in the dorsal striatal component was related to the extent to which 
individuals showed an instrumental learning bias (figure 8). We did not observe a 
negative relationship between inter-individual variation in the cortical component 
and the instrumental learning bias, nor did we observe any age effects of this bias.
Table 3. Component loadings of the three principal components recovered from 
the PCA with varimax rotation. Cortical ROI BPNDs loaded on component 1, dorsal 
striatal ROI BPNDs loaded on component 2, and the NAcc solely loaded on com-
ponent 3. 
component 1: 
cortical
component 2: 
dorsal striatal
component 3: 
ventral striatal
Caudate .39 .88 .18
Putamen .32 .85 .34
Nucleus accumbens .24 .26 .93
dlPFC/vlPFC: BA 9,44,45,46 .80 .48 .22
Limbic cortex: lateral/medial OFC .72 .39 .45
Premotor cortex: BA 4,6 .92 .19 .17
Parietal cortex: IPL .79 .46 .20
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Conclusion 
This suggests that D1-Rs are, to an extent, organised functionally in the human 
brain, and that this functional organisation affects behaviour. Specifically, dorsal 
striatal D1-R availability determines the extent to which individuals express an 
instrumental learning bias.
Study 4
The relationship between the representation of action and valence anticipa-
tory patterns and dopamine D1 receptor availability 
A first draft of this manuscript has been finalised with the co-authors Jan Axelsson, 
Katrine Riklund, Lars Nyberg, Lars Bäckman and Marc Guitart-Masip
Aim
Previous studies suggest that the representation of anticipated action dominates 
the representation of anticipated value in the striatum. Further, a previous study 
has shown that boosting the dopaminergic system with levodopa enhanced neural 
representations of actions, but only when these lead to rewarding outcomes. This 
has a bearing on the dopaminergic system and its integrity, as dopamine promotes 
actions coupled with valence. On the other hand, outcome processing shows a 
main effect of valence, with better than expected outcomes giving rise to activity 
in the NAcc, and worse than expected outcomes giving rise to activity in the insula, 
two central structures in the dopaminergic circuit. This study will investigate how 
endogenous dopamine integrity gives rise to patterns of action/valence representa-
tion, modulate outcome processing, and how these patterns are affected by aging. 
Figure 8. Loadings on component 2 (dorsal striatal D1-R availability) correlated posi-
tively with the extent to which individuals displayed an instrumental learning bias in the 
Go/No-Go task (r=0.48, p=0.005). 
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Methods
We used the instructed go/no-go task, where participants learned the action/
outcome contingencies and therefore performed at a high level. We predicted 
this would give rise to different neural patterns which will represent go and 
no-go patterns, possibly interacting with valence. Since levodopa enhanced the 
representation of anticipatory rewarding actions, and attenuated anticipatory 
rewarded inactions in a previous study, we expected to see enhanced GW activity 
(compared with NGW) in those with higher levels of dopamine D1 availability in 
striatum. In order to investigate this, we used 2x2x2x3 MANOVAs to investigate 
the interaction between dopamine receptor availability and neural representation 
of action and valence in the striatum. We also performed 2x2x2x3 MANOVAs 
on positive and negative RPE signalling to investigate outcome processing in the 
ventral striatum and insula. 
Results
We found that in anticipatory activity, action dominated valence in all areas we 
investigated in the striatum. We did not observe a main effect of valence, nor did 
we observe an interaction between action and valence in anticipatory activity 
in the striatum. At outcome, the NAcc was responsive to better than expected 
outcomes, and the insula was responsive to worse than expected outcomes. We 
observed an attenuation of negative outcome processing in the insula in old age. 
The extent to which participants showed this attenuation was related to punish-
ment sensitivity during the learning phase of the go/no-go task. In addition, we 
observed an interaction between cortical D1-R availability and differentiation 
between reward and punishment prediction errors in the insula (Figure 9).
Conclusion
Punishment processing in the insula may be attenuated in older adults, which 
may account for decreased punishment sensitivity in aging. Dopamine D1-R avail-
ability in the cortex may play a role in allowing punishment prediction errors 
in the insula to emerge. 
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Figure 9. We found a significant interaction between valence condition and age group 
in parameter estimates reflecting the difference between better and worse than expected 
outcomes in the insula in both hemispheres. The insula was more responsive to worse than 
expected outcomes than better than expected outcomes in younger  participants (group x 
outcome interaction left insula: F(1,39)=13.50, p<0.001; right insula: F(1,39)=28.82, 
p<0.001). In addition, younger participants showed a stronger differentiation between pun-
ishment prediction errors and RPEs (group x valence interaction left insula: F(1,39)=5.24, 
p=0.03; right insula: F(1,39)=7.62, p=0.009). The three-way  interaction reflecting 
enhanced differentiation for younger compared to older adults, in  punishment conditions 
specifically was also significant in both hemispheres (group x outcome x valence left insula: 
F(1,39)=5.02, p=0.03; right insula: F(1,39)=10.59, p=0.002) right panel: We also 
found an interaction between outcome, valence condition and cortical D1-R availability, 
reflecting enhanced differentiation for those with higher dopamine D1-R component load-
ing (cortical D1 x outcome x valence left insula: F(1,39)=6.92, p=0.01; right insula: 
F(1,39)=5.01, p=0.03. A subsequent correlation analysis revealed that this correla-
tion was significant for the left insula (0.35, p=0.02) and for the right insula (r=0.30, 
p=0.05). For display purposes, the averaged values between right and left insular activa-
tion are presented.
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DISCUSSION
In this thesis, I have investigated neural and behavioural correlates of value-
based decision-making in a group of older and a group of younger adults. Study 
1 and 2 showed that value signalling in the vmPFC can predict performance on 
a probabilistic reward learning task. This value signal was attenuated in older, 
compared with younger adults. Two indicators of neural integrity predict the 
strength of this signal beyond age: First, the dopamine D1-R availability in the 
NAcc. Second, the integrity of the white matter connection between the NAcc and 
the vmPFC. We used a Bayesian observer model that moderates choices based 
on uncertainty and confidence measures to analyse behavioural data the TAB, 
and showed that this model fits behaviour better than a Rescorla-Wagner model 
that included perseveration and stickiness parameters. 
Study 3 and 4 focused on dissociating the effects of action and valence on neural 
and behavioural correlates of decision-making. In study 3, we used computational 
modelling to characterize a commonly observed motivational bias as being a result 
of biased instrumental learning, as opposed to Pavlovian coupling of action and 
valence. Study 3 also showed that we could decompose dopamine D1-R availability 
variability into cortical, dorsal striatal and ventral striatal components. Regardless 
of age, dopamine D1-R availability in the dorsal striatum was related to biased 
learning from rewarded actions. Lastly, study 4 showed that once choice-outcome 
contingencies are learned, older adults did not differ from younger adults in antici-
patory neural responses to action and valence. We did not observe a relationship 
between these anticipatory responses and dopamine D1-R availability. However, 
older adults showed an attenuated punishment prediction error signal in the insula. 
The strength of this punishment prediction error signal was related to dopamine 
D1-R availability in the cortex. 
Reward prediction errors and striatal D1
One of the aims of this thesis was to investigate age differences between neural 
correlates of RPEs in the striatum. The TAB that was used in study 1 and 2 is 
designed to continuously evoke behaviourally relevant RPEs, through the fluc-
tuating probabilities of reward for each bandit arm. This requires participants to 
continuously update the relative values of each arm. In study 4 on the other hand, 
we could only investigate RPEs that arose as a result of the task’s probabilistic 
design, where occasional unexpected rewards or reward omissions violated what 
participants had learned, but did not instruct participants to update behaviour. 
This instructed nature of the task leads to stable estimates of the expected value 
component of RPEs for stimuli in study 4. 
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Due to the task design, we could investigate canonical RPE signals in the striatum 
in study 1. Canonical RPEs reflect the TD learning RPE at the time of reward 
delivery (Garrison et al., 2013; O’Doherty et al., 2003). Activity reflecting these 
RPEs should positively track the size of the reward delivered, but negatively 
track the expected value of the reward-predicting cue, as these two components 
both determine the size of the RPE (Behrens et al., 2008; Chowdhury et al., 
2013a; Stenner et al., 2015). Chowdhury et al. (2013a) observed no expected 
value component of the RPE in older participants on placebo. When the dopa-
minergic system was boosted with L-DOPA however, this expected value com-
ponent emerged (Chowdhury et al., 2013a). Because of the deterioration of the 
dopaminergic system with age, we expected that young people would show the 
same pattern of activity as older participants on L-DOPA in that study. Contrary 
to what we expected, we observed activity in the NAcc positively correlated with 
putative RPE (the  simple difference between reward and expected value), but no 
activity in this area also negatively correlated with expected value in the young 
or older participants. 
Because of the low temporal resolution of fMRI, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the two components of the RPE did not emerge in study 1. The BOLD signal 
may reflect a variety of distinct processes that are similarly energy-demanding, 
and therefore emerge as a seemingly unified signal (Haber and Behrens, 2014). 
Finer-grained methods like electrophysiology may be necessary to detect both 
RPE components (Stenner et al., 2015). The task design for study 4 did not allow 
for an investigation into canonical prediction errors in the NAcc. Similarly to 
in study 1, we did observe a BOLD signal reflecting a putative RPE in study 4 
in the NAcc. 
In neither of these studies did we observe a relationship between dopamine D1-R 
availability and putative RPEs in the NAcc. This is surprising in the light of evi-
dence from animal and human studies. Namely, the hypothesis that the neural 
RPE would be related to dopamine D1-R availability rests on the assumption 
that dopaminergic bursts from the midbrain in response to differences between 
received and expected rewards are translated into a BOLD signal in the NAcc 
(Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Soares-Cunha et al., 2016). D1-Rs have lower affin-
ity to dopamine compared to D2-Rs, which implies that their activation requires 
phasic changes such as bursts of dopamine release in response to RPEs (Soares-
Cunha et al., 2016). More availability of dopamine D1-Rs would result in more 
action potentials where D1 is expressed, which would in turn lead to more 
BOLD activation (Knutson and Gibbs, 2007). Boosting older adults’ system with 
L-DOPA also amplified the expected value component of the neural RPE signal 
in the NAcc (Chowdhury et al., 2013a). In addition, studies in rats have shown 
D1-R blockade leads to an attenuation of NAcc activity in response to cocaine 
injections (Dixon et al., 2005; Marota et al., 2000). 
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However, the strength of activation in the NAcc is not only a result of the acti-
vation of postsynaptic D1-Rs. D2 autoreceptors on presynaptic terminals also 
regulate the amount of dopamine that is released in the NAcc, and agonizing 
these auto receptors can attenuate BOLD responses in the NAcc (Chen et al., 
2005). Thus, the relationship between D1-R availability and RPE is affected by 
the availability and activation of presynaptic D2 autoreceptors as well. Another 
possible explanation for the lack of relationship between the two can be found 
in the central position the NAcc has in the mesolimbic complex, receiving input 
from the midbrain, but also from a range of other cortical and subcortical areas 
(Grace et al., 2007). For example, a recent study in rats by Helbing et al. (2016) 
showed that stimulating the perforant pathway, which activates the mesolimbic 
system through the hippocampus, without causing dopamine release from the 
SN/VTA, resulted in BOLD activity in the NAcc. Importantly, this NAcc BOLD 
activation was still observed when rats were given the D1-R antagonist SCH23390, 
suggesting that BOLD activity in NAcc does not merely reflect D1-R activation. 
Conversely, the activation of the ACC/mPFC in rats as a result from perforant 
pathway stimulation was attenuated when rats were given SCH23390 (Helbing 
et al., 2016), suggesting that D1-R stimulation is necessary for the activation of 
prefrontal mesolimbic circuit components. This fits our finding in study 1, where 
we showed that D1-R availability in the NAcc was predictive of the BOLD signal 
reflecting the value signal in vmPFC, but not to RPEs. 
Lastly, it is important to note that because the RPEs we observed were only puta-
tive, not canonical RPEs, they are highly correlated with the effect of reward 
alone. Since dopaminergic activity reflects the expected value component as 
well as the reward component of the RPE, it needs not to correlate with a neural 
signal reflecting reward alone. 
Learning signals and striatal D1
Although we did not observe any relationship between D1-R availability in the 
NAcc and neural RPEs, we did find relationships between striatal dopamine D1-R 
availability and neural correlates of value-based decision-making throughout the 
brain across age groups. In study 1, this could be observed in the form of a rela-
tionship between NAcc D1-R availability and anticipatory value-related vmPFC 
activity during probabilistic reward learning. Further expanding on this finding, 
study 2 demonstrated a relationship between the white-matter microstructural 
integrity of the pathway between NAcc and vmPFC and this anticipatory activ-
ity. In study 3, we showed a relationship between instrumental learning biases 
and dopamine D1-R availability in the dorsal striatum. All of these findings are 
in agreement with the theory of corticostriatal loops and the dopaminergic direct 
and indirect pathway modulate the activity and efficiency of these loops (Frank 
and O’Reilly, 2006; Haber and Behrens, 2014). 
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This theoretical framework posits that different cortical regions engage in different 
computations. These cortical regions all project to the striatum, in a functional 
topographic manner (see introduction), which converge there. Because of this 
functional organization, the striatum is thought to be central in the development 
of goal directed behaviour as a consequence of learning. Thus, good communica-
tion links between cortex and striatum, as well as an intact dopaminergic system 
are needed to make decisions that integrate these cortical computations. 
Specifically, the vmPFC is known to provide one of the most robust value computa-
tion signals in fMRI studies, and lesions to this region in both hon-human primates 
and humans result in an inability to adapt value-based decisions to contingencies in 
the environment (Camille et al., 2011). Interestingly, a study where patients did not 
have to adapt their behaviour to a changing environment did not find a relation-
ship between vmPFC lesion and behaviour, in this case on a monetary-incentive 
delay task (Pujara et al., 2016). This suggests that value-based decision-making 
and adapting behaviour to changing environmental contingencies may be specifi-
cally related to vmPFC function. Because of this robust signal, but also because of 
the consistent observation that damage to vmPFC impairs learning from rewards, 
the vmPFC is thought to be crucial for translating the valuation of one or more 
stimuli into a selection between stimuli (Hunt et al., 2012; Jocham et al., 2012). 
The vmPFC has extensive projections to many different regions in the brain includ-
ing the NAcc, and receives input from the NAcc as well, through the regulatory 
influence that NAcc activity has on basal ganglia and midbrain dopaminergic 
projections (Haber and Behrens, 2014). Specifically, D1-Rs in the NAcc may 
regulate the representation of rewarded choices in the vmPFC. Thus, it is pos-
sible that the D1-Rs in the NAcc play a role in gating the expected-value signal 
that emerges in the vmPFC, for example through downward projections from the 
vmPFC encouraging dopamine release in response to rewarding stimuli, which 
iteratively via the NAcc, arrives back in the vmPFC. Alternatively, dopamine 
release in response to highly valued stimuli may lead to an increased efficiency 
in communication between the NAcc and vmPFC in those individuals with high 
concentrations of dopamine D1-R availability. Study 2 showed that the integrity 
of the white-matter microstructure between NAcc and vmPFC also positively cor-
related with the strength of the value-signal in vmPFC, supporting the premise 
that efficient direct communication between these two areas is crucial for the 
emergence of this value signal. Although this upregulation of preferred value 
representations can be explained with direct-indirect pathway circuitry, recent 
optogenetic findings have shown that 50% of dorsal ventral pallidum neurons, 
which are part of the indirect pathway, receive input from NAcc D1 MSNs as 
well as NAcc D2 MSNs. This suggests that the direct/indirect pathway architec-
ture does not apply to NAcc projections (Kupchik et al., 2015). This may provide 
evidence for a more sophisticated role of D1 MSNs in the NAcc, balancing the 
direct and indirect pathway activity in this area. 
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Study 3 showed that dopamine D1-R availability in dorsal striatum (more spe-
cifically, in caudate and putamen) could predict the instrumental learning bias 
participants showed on a valenced go/no-go task where they had to learn action/
valence contingencies. This bias, specifically, quantified the extent to which par-
ticipants learned more from reward actions, compared to rewarded inactions. 
This finding fits the theory that the direct pathway, which D1-Rs are a part of, 
strengthens associations between rewards and the actions that lead to them. 
Specifically, activation of this pathway leads to the reinforcement of the previ-
ously executed action. The direct pathway becomes activated when dopamine 
neurons in the midbrain are active in response to unexpected rewards. Because 
the direct pathway then lowers the threshold for the repetition of the previ-
ously executed action (through increased connectivity between the thalamus 
and the cortex), this leads the direct pathway to couple actions with rewards, 
and discourages actions in response to punishments. The direct pathway activa-
tion leads to a lowering of the action threshold for actions that were previously 
rewarded (Kravitz et al., 2012). An increased availability in dopamine D1-Rs in 
dorsal striatum could therefore result in a more sensitive direct pathway, which 
encourages the actions in response to reward, but has more difficulty learning to 
put forward inaction patterns when rewarding stimuli are presented. 
In summary, we have observed that dopamine D1-R availability in the striatum 
may be relevant in situations where individuals have to continuously update their 
representations of action propensities and reward. Based on previous evidence 
and a lack evidence for an association between performance or brain activity on 
the instructed Go/No-Go task after learning in the studies presented in this thesis, 
we could speculate that once choice-outcome associations are learned, as was 
the case in study 4, striatal D1-R availability do not show a clear relationship to 
neural or behavioural representations of expected value. Conversely, our data 
suggests that striatal dopamine D1-Rs are crucially important for the updating 
of cortical representations by gating corticostriatal loops.
Cortical D1-Rs and punishment processing in the insula
In an exploratory analysis, we found a relationship between individual loadings 
on the cortical D1 component and punishment prediction errors in the insula 
in study 4. The insula bears resemblance to the vmPFC in that it shows robust 
activation in response to value, but in the case of the insula, to negatively valued 
stimuli (Kim et al., 2006; Palminteri et al., 2012). It projects to the NAcc and likely 
also contributes to the updating of value representations that happens in the stria-
tum (Haber and Behrens, 2014). Additionally, damage to the insula has shown to 
lead to impairments in punishment learning (Clark et al., 2008; Palminteri et al., 
2012). The reason for a relationship between dopamine D1-R availability in the 
cortex and insular activation in response to punishment prediction errors could 
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stem from the presumed role of D1-Rs in the cortex in working memory (Seamans 
and Yang, 2004), where they are thought to increase the signal-to-noise ratio of 
working memory representations. Cortical D1-R availability may be required for 
the robust representations of punishment-related information in the insula. This, 
of course, rests on the assumption that the cortical D1 component we found in 
study 3 reflects insular D1-R availability as well. As the insula was not included 
as a region of interest, this is an open question for future investigations. 
An alternative explanation for the relationship between D1-R availability and 
neural activity in study 4 can be found in the properties of the radiotracer that 
was used. [11C]SCH23390 does not only bind to D1-Rs in the brain – it also shows 
a (albeit much lower) affinity for 5-HT2A receptors (Ekelund et al., 2007; Slifstein 
et al., 2007). This has been shown to affect binding potentials in the cortex. In 
the striatum, this is not as much of an issue because the number of D1-Rs is many 
times greater than 5-HT2A receptors. In the cortex however, 5-HT2A can represent 
up to 25% of the PET signal recorded with [11C]SCH23390 (Ekelund et al., 2007). 
As our PCA was performed to separate the variability in D1-R binding into dif-
ferent components, I posit two possible interpretations of the first component. 
First, if cortical and striatal D1-R density in the brain share a large amount of 
variance, all of that variance could have been captured in component 2 or 3, 
leaving 5-HT2A variability to make up component 1. Second, if cortical and stri-
atal D1-R density do not share a large amount of variance, component 1 could 
capture the variability in 5-HT2A, as well as cortical D1-R availability, making 
this a component that at least describes the variability in both. 
Serotonin has previously been theorized to be involved in punishment process-
ing, and form an opponency axis with dopamine, although a two-dimensional 
spectrum to explain serotonin functioning has been acknowledged to be an over-
simplification (Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Daw et al., 2002; den Ouden et al., 
2013). Given the complexity of the serotonin system, which acts on 14 different 
receptor types (Boureau and Dayan, 2011), the exploratory nature of this find-
ing, and the speculative nature of the involvement of the serotonin system, the 
possible serotonergic mechanisms at play will not be discussed further here.
Age effects on behavioural and neural correlates of 
decision-making
In line with the aims of this thesis, I have provided explanations for why older 
adults may be worse at value-based decision-making, compared to younger adults 
in three of the four studies considered (study 1, 2 and 4). In study 1 and 2, the 
observed relationship between neural correlates of expected value and perfor-
mance on the task survived correction for age, suggesting that 1) this signal may 
get weaker as people age and 2) even within groups of individuals of the same 
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age, variability in the strength of this signal predicts performance. Note that the 
cross-sectional nature of these investigations does not allow drawing conclusions 
about the change in signal over time, but these observed relationships are the most 
convincing evidence one could observe in this dataset for how age-related neural 
changes may affect performance. Conversely, in study 4, we observed age-related 
attenuation of a punishment prediction error signal in the insula. This reduced 
neural signal was related to punishment sensitivity in learning during study 3, 
which was reduced in old age. However, the relationship between age-related 
attenuation and behaviour did not survive correction for age in this study. This 
could mean that neural integrity is affected by age, which consequently affects 
neural signalling and behaviour. It could also mean that age affects a range of 
different behavioural and neural factors that do not have an effect on each other. 
It should be noted that in cases of age-mediation in cross sectional studies, mediator 
variables related to cross-sectional differences need not correlate with longitudinal 
change, and mediator variables unrelated to cross-sectional differences could cor-
relate with longitudinal change (Lindenberger et al., 2011). This means that for 
study 1 and 2, longitudinal validation of our findings is required. Despite relatively 
robust evidence that longitudinal changes in white-matter microstructure do in 
fact occur, this cross-sectional mediation is no definite evidence for the exist-
ence of a causal change relationship. However, even though our data does not 
allow for causal reasoning, lesion studies support the behavioural relevance of 
the functional MRI and structural brain correlates that were correlated to age and 
relevant to behaviour in our sample, both for the vmPFC and the insula (Pujara 
et al., 2016; Weller et al., 2009). 
It should also be noted that no age differences in instrumental learning bias 
parameterN were observed in study 3, which is in line with findings from other 
cross-sectional datasets (Perosa et al., Betts et al., unpublished findings). Given 
a large difference between age groups in dopamine D1-R availability in the 
striatum, this suggests that D1-R availability only cannot predict the extent to 
which individuals show an instrumental learning bias, as that would result in a 
large behavioural difference between age groups, with the older group showing 
less instrumental learning bias compared to the younger group. Dopaminergic 
integrity is unlikely to be the only factor that drives reward learning behaviour, 
but it does seem to be able to explain a significant amount in the variability in an 
instrumental learning bias in two groups of different ages. However, D1-R avail-
ability in the striatum is not only factor that causes individuals to pair (or avoid 
pairing) action and valence. Other possible mechanisms for this observation could 
include D2-R availability (Richter et al., 2014), concentration of other catechola-
mines (Swart et al., 2017), dopamine synthesis capacity (Berry et al., 2016), and 
frontal executive control over such biases (Cavanagh et al., 2013).
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In addition to the results discussed above, we also observed a slower learning 
rate in older adults, in study 1 (Rescorla-Wagner model), and in study 3 (both 
datasets). This is in line with previous findings showing that older adults  generally 
adapt more slowly to quickly changing environments (Eppinger et al., 2011; Mell 
et al., 2005; Weiler et al., 2008). Similarly, in line with previous studies, we found 
a difference in sensitivity to punishments between age groups (Chowdhury et al., 
2013b, 2014; Mata et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, the evidence on attenuated responses to punishment prediction 
errors as we found in study 4 in old age is mixed. Our result showed, specifically, 
that older adults’ neural responses to punishment prediction errors (compared to 
negative RPEs during reward omission) were attenuated. Some previous studies 
have also found that outcome processing in the anterior insula is attenuated in 
older participants (Cox et al., 2008). Other studies show that outcome processing 
is similar between age groups in the insula (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2008), or that 
punishment anticipation, but not punishment outcome processing is attenuated in 
older adults (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007). Similarly, although a range of studies 
found a decreased sensitivity to negative outcomes in older adults (Chowdhury 
et al., 2014; Harlé and Sanfey, 2012), some studies have also found an increased 
sensitivity to punishments in older adults, especially those above the age of 80 
(Frank and Kong, 2008). On the other hand, a common observation in emotional 
processing and risk-taking in older adults is that they display an optimism bias 
(Berry et al., 2019; Kalenzaga et al., 2016; Nashiro et al., 2017; Reed and Carstensen, 
2012) and are more willing to take risks in decision-making tasks where they learn 
from experience (Mata et al., 2011), which would suggest a reduced sensitivity to 
punishment. In addition, there is widespread evidence that the insula is one of the 
most atrophied brain areas in old age (Allen et al., 2005), which may account for 
its decreased activation during punishment prediction errors. 
Computational modelling
In study 1, 2, and 3 we used computational models that could simulate RL 
processes and Bayesian observer processes. In study 1 and 2, we showed that a 
Bayesian observer model described our observed behavioural data better compared 
to a more standard Rescorla-Wagner RL model. However, predictions from the 
Rescorla-Wagner model fit neural activity better in the NAcc, whereas predic-
tions from the Bayesian observer model fit neural activity better in the vmPFC. 
This suggests that the processes that happen in different brain regions may best 
be described by different computational models. 
Of course, the possible model space is infinite. Rescorla-Wagner and Bayesian 
observer model are only two types of models. Many more different types exist 
(Huys et al., 2016), and some different models could provide equally good 
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explanations for the same behavioural phenomena (Teufel and Fletcher, 2016). 
An example in the current thesis is the modelling procedure for the study 3. 
In this analysis, N and π capture similar processes: whereas N boosts learning 
from rewarded actions (and punished inactions), π boosts the value of an action 
when its potential outcome is a rewarded. These parameters tap into two dif-
ferent processes with similar manifestations in the current task. Although our 
model selection procedure indicated that a model with a single N described our 
data best in study 3, data from a very similar dataset (with a slightly longer task 
runs) was best modelled with a model that also included π. In addition, N in the 
datasets that we modelled sometimes took on negative values for a subset of par-
ticipants, implying the opposite effect of a motivational bias. Investigations into 
this on the paradigm described here are currently ongoing, but it is important to 
emphasize that models and tasks should not be stretched beyond what reason-
able neurobiological processes the model could capture, especially because other 
tasks have been developed to explicitly separate the instrumental component of 
this bias from the Pavlovian component (Swart et al., 2017). Modelling simulated 
performance data on the current task will shed light on the extent to which these 
models and their different processes can be disentangled, and to which extent they 
are reasonable in light of the underlying neurobiological hypotheses. The limits 
of reason should constantly be under scrutiny from the scientific community. 
Limitations
In both versions of the valenced go/no-go task in this thesis, performance was 
relatively low compared to previous studies, especially in older adults (Chowdhury 
et al., 2013b). There may be several reasons for the relatively low performance 
on this task, but one obvious explanation is the distance between the responsible 
researchers on this project and those that collected data in Umeå. Because data 
was collected remotely, there was less hands-on researcher involvement dur-
ing data collection. This means that we as experienced researchers who study 
behaviour on decision-making tasks were not present whenever instructions 
would have been misunderstood by participants or instructors. If this is indeed 
the reason, the impact of this distance on data quality has been significant. This 
highlights the importance of quality assurance and management by researchers 
on-site, especially for more complex experimental designs. 
In study 1, 2, and 4, dopamine D1-R availability or microstructural white matter 
integrity was significantly correlated to neural signals that could predict perfor-
mance, but not to performance itself. This indirect relationship to performance 
poses the question whether these measures of integrity in these cases really is 
important for good behaviour on these tasks. The direct relationship between 
dopamine D1-R availability and performance is perhaps more easily detected in 
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larger samples than the current one. In addition, one previous study demonstrated 
a relationship between white-matter microstructural integrity of this pathway 
and probabilistic reward learning (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2012). However, rep-
lications of the findings presented in this thesis are necessary to strengthen the 
validity of these findings. 
Conclusion
The studies in this thesis provide important multimodal evidence that increases 
our understanding of the neural correlates that underlie value-based decision-
making. First, we found a value signal in vmPFC that was affected by age, and 
could be predicted by dopaminergic integrity and microstructural integrity of 
white matter in the corticostriatal complex. Second, we demonstrated that D1-R 
availability in the striatum is related to the extent to which people learn from 
rewarded actions, compared to inactions. These studies have demonstrated that 
the existing theoretical framework surrounding the role of dopamine receptors 
in the basal ganglia fits with PET and behavioural data in older and younger 
adults. Importantly, these studies have also demonstrated that the dopaminer-
gic system is complex, and that dopamine D1-R availability data alone cannot 
provide conclusive evidence on, for example, the role RPEs play in learning. In 
addition, other neurotransmitters and functional brain correlates likely play other 
important roles in decision-making in a complex environment. 
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